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Chapter 1
Introduction
Coffee holds a very unique and important position in
international commodity trade. Currently, total coffee
exports are about $13 billion a year and affect over 25
percent of the total foreign exchange of many of the Less
Developed Countries (LDCs) including Cote d'lvoire (formerly
Ivory Coast) . Great fluctuations in coffee prices over the
years have resulted in an instability in LDC export revenues
and have caused concerns among producing nations.
The strategies employed in solving the coffee
problem have in general concentrated on reducing price
variability through export restrictions implemented by
International Commodity Agreements. But these measures too
often have limited success as they cannot totally control
variations in quantity supplied. Hence, major price
fluctuations still characterize the coffee market.
Several investigators have suggested active
participation of LDCs producers in futures markets (Thompson,
Petzel) as a means of improving their export performance and
a way to ensure price stability and more stable export
revenues. Although many conditions, both real and imagined
(ignorance, fear, cost), have kept LDCs from successfully
using the futures markets, a better understanding of futures
trading and greater recognition of the potential net benefits
of hedging may increase the use of futures markets as a tool
in international trade.
1.1. Importance of the Study
As a third world coffee producer, Cote d'lvoire
relies heavily on coffee export earnings in pursuing
development plans. But erratic movements in international
coffee prices result in major fluctuations in foreign exchange
earnings even in the presence of International Commodity
Agreements (ICAs) . Thus, coffee market price uncertainty
jeopardizes the country's planning efforts.
Price fluctuations have always been a part of the
coffee history and remain a noticeable phenomenon even today.
According to the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization)
prices deflated by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) index
of consumer price in industrial countries, coffee prices
continuously showed a tremendous volatilily. For example, in
1977, Robusta coffee prices hit a record high of 293.59 cents
per pound. Prices went down one year later to 180.4 6 cents per
pound in 1978 before falling further to 93.90 cents in 1981.
By 1983, coffee prices were however on the rise and reached
100.16 cents per pound that year. The average annual Robusta
prices, from 1961 to 1983, calculated from the same FAO
sources was 115.87 cents per pound while the coefficient of
variation in average annual coffee prices in the international
market over the same period was 43.46 percent. Export earnings
from Cote d'lvoire reported by the FAO showed earnings of
$13.2 million in 1977, $6.6 million in 1978, $3.4 million in
1981, and $3.9 million in 1983. The coefficient of variation
in annual coffee revenues over the twenty-three year period
was 64.13 percent. Coffee volume exported has known some
fluctuations although of a lesser degree than the fluctuations
in earnings. Exports were 4.5 million bags in 1977, 3.7
million bags in 1978, 3.6 million bags in 1981 and 3.9 million
bags in 1983.
These significant factors point out the nature of
the problem any coffee producer and in our case, Cote
d'lvoire, is faced with, and explain why it is important that
Cote d'lvoire seeks marketing strategies that will assist in
stabilizing its export earnings from coffee. Price and revenue
instability are urgent problems.
Increasing research attention has already been given
to analysis of the benefits that futures trading might provide
to the LDCs upon their active participation in the market. In
particular, price and income stabilization potential of the
futures market has already been explored. The possibility of
shifting price risk to speculators by hedging has been
proposed many times (e.g. Peck, Thompson) . Several hedging
strategies are identified in the literature. They include
insurance hedging, storage or inventory hedging, and more
recently, forward or anticipatory hedging.
Within this array of possible strategies,
anticipatory hedging, "hedging carried out to maximize
expected returns for a given risk," (Thompson 1985) sounds
most viable for the LDC risk-averse coffee producer. Shifting
of price risk may permit Cote d'lvoire to achieve some
increase in short-run stability of coffee earnings, thus
enhancing its ability to make financial commitments for
development planning.
1.2. Objectives of the Study
The general objective of this research is to
evaluate the use of futures trading as a way to reduce income
instability from international sale of coffee for Cote
d'lvoire as a representative of coffee producing countries.
The specific objectives of the study are as follow:
1. To determine random, seasonal, annual, and cyclical price
variation in world coffee markets.
2. To determine supply and demand conditions for Cote d'lvoire
export coffee (Robusta) and for competing products (Arabica,
Brazilian Milds) that have affected price variation over the
years.
3. To determine the price impact of changes in institutional
conditions governing world price formation on the coffee
market.
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.
To identify and test strategies for use of futures markets
as a tool to minimize negative impacts of variations in world
coffee prices on revenue patterns from Cote d'lvoire coffee
export.
1.3. Outline of the Study
The introductory first Chapter will be followed in
Chapter 2 by a review of applicable recent literature on
futures markets and the role of futures markets in
international trade in coffee.
Given the importance of coffee for the economies of
many LDCs and its importance in international trade, an
overview of the world coffee market structure and behavior and
the origins and characteristics of the coffee industry
problems will be presented in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 4, Cote d'lvoire is chosen as a typical
African coffee producer to show the impact of coffee on a
specific less-developed economy.
Chapter 5 will introduce the futures markets and
their hedging opportunities with specific references to coffee
trading on the two most active markets - New York and
London.
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Chapter 6 will present the theoretical model of an
optimal hedge using a mean-variance framework and the results
will be reported and interpreted.
Finally, Chapter 7 will close the thesis as we draw
the conclusions and make certain recommendations.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1. Early Development of Futures Trading
Active futures markets exist for a great variety of
commodities today. But when futures first arose more than a
hundred years ago, they were confined to agricultural and
metal products only.
2.1.1. Forward Contracts and Futures Contracts
According to Anne Peck (1985) , the forward markets
for grain (corn and wheat) that existed in Chicago in the
second half of the nineteenth century were responsible for the
emergence of the futures market as it is known today. No
specific date, says the author, can be attached to the
beginning of "organized futures markets" because their
development was evolutionary. The futures market is viewed and
defined as a "standardized forward market". With a
standardized sales unit and specified delivery conditions, the
only item to be negotiated when buying or selling a futures
contract is price. A forward contract in general permits
individual buyers and sellers to agree on a future transfer of
a commodity on terms, including price, that are mutually
convenient. Buyer and seller assume full responsibility vis-a-
vis each other, while in a futures contract, there is a third
party involved. That third party is the clearinghouse. The
clearinghouse in a futures market assures the settlement of
contracts. It assumes the position of buyer to each seller and
vice-versa. Therefore, all the parties involved in a futures
contract are responsible vis-a-vis the clearinghouse rather
than to each other.
In general, futures markets and forward markets, as
well as physical markets are complementary to each other as
they all three still remain important. Physical or cash
markets are for immediate delivery markets at spot price.
Forward markets allow traders to mutually agree on specific
terms to the future delivery of the commodity. Futures markets
are standardized forward markets where only price is
negotiable. Futures markets are growing in importance for
diverse commodities.
2.1.2. Expansion in Futures Markets in the 1970s
Futures markets originated with continuously
storable commodities. Early literature on the most important
role plausibly played by futures markets focused on the
hedging of inventories. Gray and Rutledge (1973) referred to
Working's price of storage theory (1969) as the "culmination"
of the inventory hedging view of futures markets. Working
contended that the cash/futures price differential (positive
or negative) reflected a true price of storage for continuous
inventory commodities.
Recent developments have, however, shifted
analytical approaches to other allocative and stabilizing
functions of the futures markets. Other than traditional
storable commodities have come to play an increasing role in
the market and have shown the evolution of futures trading in
adapting to new commercial needs.
2.1.2.1. Non-Storable Commodities
According to Gray and Rutledge the evolution of
trading in egg futures at Chicago provided a good illustration
of the altered role of futures trading. The egg futures market
which first emerged as an inventory hedging market "par
excellence" soon gave rise in 1967 to a fresh egg futures
contract enabling forward price hedging in a situation where
inventory no longer was at stake. Similarly, introduction of
futures markets in potatoes and onions encountered some
opposition as reported by Gray and Rutledge, partly because
they didn't fit the "traditional mold." They were not as
continuously storable as wheat or corn.
In more recent years, the trading mechanisms and
contract rules of trading have adapted to an expanded demand
for new services. Very active trading exists in futures
contracts in markets as diverse as live cattle, live hogs,
chicken and even financial instruments.
2.1.2.2. Financial Futures Markets
Financial Futures are divided into three groups:
foreign currencies, interest rate contracts, and stock index
futures.
The first financial futures contracts on foreign
currencies in the U.S.A. were introduced in 1972 in Chicago,
followed by interest rate futures in 1975 and by stock index
futures in 1982. Foreign currency futures are traded on the
International Monetary Market (IMM) which is a division of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) . The most commonly traded
foreign currencies on the U.S. Exchange are: the British
pound, the Canadian dollar, the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc,
and the West German mark (Table 2.1.).
For most financial futures, as for most storable
commodities in general, the main contribution of futures
markets remains the price discovery and hedging functions
available as instruments of risk reduction. On the other hand,
financial futures markets promote greater liquidity than do
cash markets and thus allow the management of risk at reduced
transaction costs.
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TABLE 2.1.
Major Financial Futures Contracts, 1972-1984
Contract Exchange Began Trading
Foreign currencies
British pound IMM 1972
Canadian dollar IMM 1972
Japanese yen IMM 1972
Swiss franc IMM 1972
West German mark IMM 1972
Interest rates
Treasury bills IMM 1976
Bank CDs IMM 1981
Eurodollars IMM 1981
CNMAs CBT 1975
Treasury bonds CBT 1977
Treasury notes CBT 1982
Stock index
Major Market index CBT 1984
NYSE composite NYFE 1982
S&P 500 CME 1982
Value Line KCBT 1982
Notes: CBT = Chicago Board of Trade; CME = Chicago Mercantile Exchange; IMM
International Monetary Market (Division of CME); KCBT = Kansas City Board of
Trade; NYFE = New York Futures Exchange; and NYSE = New York Stock Exchange.
Source: Wall Street Journal listing of futures contracts.
William L. Silber, " The Economic Role of Financial Futures,"
in Futures Markets: Their Economic Role, ed. Anne Peck
Washington D.C. : (American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1985)
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Although the cash markets for most financial
instruments are well organized and highly liquid, the
financial futures markets, because of their economic benefits
have shown a considerable growth and account today for almost
50 percent of all futures trading (Silber 1985)
.
2.2. Market Functions of Commodity Futures
Futures markets have been frequently referred to as
close models of the competitive markets so often read about in
economic theory books. Because traders on the futures market
have approximately equal access to price information, use of
this information remains crucial in maintaining the integrity
of the price discovery function attributed to commodity
futures. Tomek and Robinson (1981) recognized the importance
of the price discovery function of futures markets. However,
these authors attached greater importance to the hedging
function, describing hedging as the "main economic
justification for futures markets".
A very simple definition of hedging given by the
authors is "establishing a position in the futures opposite
from the one held in the spot (cash) market." A citation of
Working (1953) as quoted by Tomek and Robinson defined a hedge
as:
the use of a futures contract as a temporary substitute
for a later transaction in the cash market. A selling
hedge starts with the sale of futures contracts, and a
buying hedge starts with the purchase of contracts.
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One objective of hedging is to protect oneself against the
risk of negative price fluctuations by shifting risk to
speculators. Gray and Rutledge in their review of literature
on futures trading came to categorize four classes of hedging
theory. They are
1. "Hedging carried out to eliminate the risk associated with
price fluctuations," which the authors qualify as a naive
concept, related to the very old view of insurance hedging.
2. "Hedging carried out to reduce the risks associated with
price fluctuations" might be the attitude of those traders who
accepted risk reduction as a major function of hedging.
3. "Hedging carried out to profit from movements in the basis"
which raised early objections from Working.
4. "Hedging carried out to maximize expected returns for a
given risk (variability of return) or minimize risk for a
given expected return." In this category, the authors cited
the works of Markowitz , who has developed the Mean-Variance
model as a portfolio selection tool.
Although Gray and Rutledge acknowledged that not all
the discussions of hedging theory clearly fell into any of the
four classes, the classification nevertheless represents the
hedgers 1 different motives.
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2.3. Basis Risk Vs. Price Risk
Working (1953) has been often cited for his emphasis
that most hedging does not have the objective of pure risk
aversion or pure price insurance. Hedging only reduces price
risks but another risk remains for the hedger to deal with,
and that is the basis risk. The basis is the differential
between a futures price and a cash price. Ordinarily the basis
narrows as the delivery month is approached, and it approaches
zero at the delivery point at the end of the delivery month.
For Rhodes (1983), in hedging, the price level doesn't matter;
only basis matters. In commodity markets, fluctuations in the
basis are almost always less than fluctuations in commodity
prices thus price risk can be reduced by hedging. In an over-
simplified situation, basis may be assumed to be constant, so
that any negative price movement in the cash market resulting
in a loss is matched by a gain in the futures market. In the
real world, basis variation may occur totally independent of
changes in commodity price levels. In extreme cases, the basis
may be inverted, meaning that the cash price rises above the
futures price to the disadvantage of the short hedger.
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2.4. International Use of Futures Trading
Futures trading extends today to commodities traded
internationally with some of the major ones, including coffee,
produced mainly in the less developed countries. The well
established futures markets exist in the developed countries
with the U.S.A. being the most active trading center. But the
participation of LDCs has been very limited despite the
potential benefits of futures market reported by academicians.
For example, Thompson (1985) listed potential benefits of
flexibility in pricing, support of commodities prices, and of
course anticipatory hedging and inventory hedging.
In fact, all the benefits associated with futures
markets as well as the availability of market information are
said to apply to the LDC exporter and active participant in
the market. It is "unfortunate," indicated Petzel (1985) that
"LDC exporters who frequently have highly informed traders, do
not give them either access to financial resources or freedom
from institutional burdens that would allow the countries to
benefit from effective hedging." It seems nevertheless that a
number of factors are responsible for the reluctance of LDCs
to use the futures markets effectively. These limiting factors
have been identified by Thompson to be:
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1. LDC exporters' skepticism of futures markets as some see
them as biased in favor of developed countries, because of
their geographic location and delivery point.
2. LDC exporters' perception of speculation as responsible for
price instability and of speculators as evil.
3. Certain LDCs fear that futures trading may be too risky.
4. For other LDCs, it is the cost involved with trading
futures that is repulsive, since one needs extremely liquid
financial reserves to maintain a futures position.
In addition to these legitimate apprehensions,
exchange rate risk remains important and according to Thompson
and Bond (1985) "will influence the extent to which offshore
hedgers participate in futures transactions whenever spot and
futures prices are perceived to interact with exchange rate
over time." To reduce the risk associated with exchange rate
fluctuations, Thompson (1985) suggests the LDC concurrently
hedge in foreign markets if there exists an active forward
market for the LDCs currency.
Although some of the factors cited and especially
exchange rate risk may influence the desirability of futures
trading for LDCs, Thompson still believes that LDCs can
successfully use the futures market to "forward price
anticipated exports" and also benefit from the flexibility in
the pricing of exports afforded by the futures. The author,
however, warns that the use of futures markets will not
completely eliminate variability in export revenues as revenue
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instability is caused by variability in quantity as well as
prices. This price and quantity uncertainty that characterize
most LDC's commodities have been taken in consideration by
Rolfo (1980) as he studies the optimal hedging level of a
cocoa producer. His results contrast with Peck's (1975) which
apply to a potato producer faced only with price variability.
Rolfo found that a 100 percent hedge would not be desirable
for his risk-averse cocoa producers.
Hedging as a risk-reducing marketing instrument and
a tool for income stabilization is gaining more support among
scholars (Gordon and Rausser 1984) . The most important thing
about hedging, affirms Scheu (1973) is to carefully analyze
what the business objectives are, and then decide to what
extent it would be acceptable to take on market risk. Thus
"hedging carried out to maximize expected returns for a given
risk (variability of return) or minimize risk for a given
return" appears a reasonable attitude to Gray and Rutledge
(1971)
.
Some chances for successfully using the futures
market will be guaranteed if, following the advice of Thompson
(1985)
,
government trading agencies are the main traders
because of their greater chances of procuring foreign exchange
than private firms in order to meet the financial requirement
of the futures market.
17
Chapter 3
The World Coffee Economy
3.1. General Background on Coffee
Coffee is a tree plant grown principally in less
developed countries, whereas consumption of coffee is mainly
concentrated in the Developed Countries (DCs) . As a
commodity, coffee holds a unique position in international
trade and has been found to be second only to crude oil as an
earner of foreign exchange to the majority of the producing
countries (Singh et al. 1977). However, coffee traded on the
international market is not a homogeneous commodity. The two
widely grown species are known as Arabica and Robusta, which
are further subdivided into specific varieties.
The coffee plant (Robusta and Arabica) is usually
grown from seed and if allowed to grow, can reach 8 meters in
height (approximately 2 6 feet) . The tree begins to bear
within three to five years but does not produce in commercial
quantities until the sixth or seventh year. Depending on the
variety and growth conditions, the productive life of mature
trees varies from fifteen to forty-five years.
These particular conditions pertaining to coffee
production result in variable and inelastic short-run supply
conditions and are undoubtedly partially responsible for the
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basic economic problems of the coffee industry, particularly
the swings in prices. Furthermore, both price and income
demand for coffee are fairly inelastic. Aggregate world price
elasticity of demand has been estimated by Singh et al.
(1977) at about - 0.25, prompting the authors to conclude
that an over-supply of coffee may not cause consumption to
increase greatly. They also found an income elasticity of
only 0.536. The short-run (one year) price elasticity of
supply was low and reported to be 0.09 for all the coffee
producing regions (Singh et al. 1977) because of the three to
five year lag in coffee tree production.
According to the authors, both the short-run and the
long-run elasticity of supply will be low in countries where
agriculture is devoted largely to coffee cultivation and
where production comes mostly from smallholders. In countries
where coffee is only of minor importance for the economy
and/or estate holdings dominate the coffee sector, short-run
supply elasticity will be higher. In the long-run, the estate
sector will show a higher supply elasticity in response to
higher prices only if the country has plenty of land
available for the estate holder to expand faster.
3.1.1. Arabica Coffee
Arabica is grown mainly in Brazil and in other Latin
American countries as well as parts of Africa. Fifty-eight of
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the seventy-nine major coffee producing countries are largely
specialized in Arabica production. Arabica is grown at higher
elevations, usually 2,000 to 5,000 feet. The ideal range of
temperature is between 17.5° C (65° F) to 22.5° C (75° F) .
Arabica is severely damaged by frost or by drought conditions
resulting in major supply impacts when these conditions
occur. Roughly 70 percent of the coffee consumed worldwide is
Arabica (Appendix A) . For marketing purposes, Arabica is
further divided into washed Arabicas or Milds and unwashed
Arabicas known as Brazils. Washed Arabica refers to coffee
for which cherries are depulped immediately and the beans
placed in water to facilitate later removal of the mucilage,
whereas unwashed Arabica refers to the coffee cherry that has
been dried and then depulped to free the beans.
On the market, washed Arabica or Milds are further
divided into "Colombian Milds" and "other Milds" and rank
first in quality as represented by price because of their
mild flavor (Table 3.1.). Brazils rank second and constitute
a good substitute for both Milds and Robustas. The soft
Santos coffees are generally considered the best grown in
Brazil
.
3.1.2. Robusta Coffee
Robusta belongs to the Coffea canephora specie and
is grown mostly in the tropics including Africa. It does well
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TABLE 3.1. COMPARISON BETWEEN GROUP INDICATOR PRICES OF OTHER
MILD ARABICAS AND ROBUSTAS; ANNUAL AVERAGES 1965 TO 1984
Difference col. (l)-(2)
Other
Mild As % of As % of
Year Arabicas Robustas Cents col.(l) col. (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1965 45.31 30.58 14.73 32.51 48.17
1966 42.12 33.53 8.59 20.39 25.62
1967 39.20 33.52 5.68 14.49 16.95
1968 39.33 33.86 5.47 13.91 16.15
1969 39.78 33.11 6.67 16.77 20.14
1970 52.01 41.44 10.57 20.32 25.51
1971 44.99 42.27 2.72 6.05 6.43
1972 50.33 45.19 5.14 10.21 11.37
1973 62.30 49.88 12.42 19.94 24.90
1974 65.84 58.68 7.16 10.87 12.20
1975 65.41 61.05 4.36 6.67 7.14
1976 142.75 127.62 15.13 10.60 11.86
1977 234.67 223.76 10.91 4.65 4.88
1978 162.82 147.48 15.34 9.42 10.40
1979 173.53 165.47 8.06 4.64 4.87
1980 154.20 147.15 7.05 4.57 4.79
1981 128.23 102.61 25.62 19.98 24.97
1982 140.05 109.94 30.11 21.50 27.39
1983 132.05 123.90 8.15 6.17 6.58
1984
Note : Indicator Prices 1968 until September 1976, Indicator
Prices 1976 from October 1976 to September 1981 and
Indicator Prices 1979 thereafter
Source: International Coffee Organization
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at low altitudes (2,000 feet down to sea level) and under
temperatures averaging 22° C (74° F) to 26° C (82° F) . High
regular rainfalls, 1,500 mm (60 inches) to 1,800 mm (72
inches) per year are necessary for the wellbeing of the
plant.
Robusta accounts for 80 percent of African
production. It is priced lower on the international market
than Brazils or Milds (Table 3.1.). However, the price gap
has narrowed over the years. Robusta prices averaged 3 6
percent below Columbian in the 1960s and only 2 6 percent
below Columbian Milds prices in the 1970s. Robusta has a
stronger flavor and higher amount of caffeine than Arabica
varieties. Milds (the highest priced coffee) and Robustas are
poor direct substitutes for each other although Brazils may
substitute for either Milds or Robusta. Thus market impacts
of supply variation by specie occur. According to Geer
(1971)
,
under given conditions and habits of consumption, the
demand for Brazils in roasted coffee depends on the price
differential between Brazils and Milds on the one hand
and Brazils and Robustas on the other. A shrinkage in the
price differential between Brazils and Milds will lead to
a reduction of Brazils in a mild blend. A widening of the
price differential will promote a substitution of Brazils
for Milds, but only to such extent that the taste barrier
will not be crossed. If the price differential between
Brazils and Robustas narrows, then a substitution of
Brazils for Robustas will occur.
In recent years, Robusta has seen its production and
demand increase because it has proven to be better suited for
soluble coffee than are Arabica varieties. World coffee
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production by species is reported in Tables 3.2. In Table 3.3.
the increase in market share of Robusta coffee at the expense
of Arabica is apparent.
3.2. World Coffee Distribution and Trade
3.2.1. Trends in World Coffee Production
Coffee has a very particular place in world trade.
All the coffee production is concentrated in Africa, Latin
America, and Asia in areas generally characterized as
economically underdeveloped. On the other hand, 92 percent of
the coffee consumption is concentrated in the developed
countries.
The three largest producers account generally for 47
to 48 percent of world production (Table 3.4.). The figures
for the 1984/85 season were: Brazil (30 percent), Colombia (12
percent), and Cote d'lvoire (5 percent). The largest importers
for the same season were the United States (30.5 percent) and
the EEC (European Economic Community; 48.15 percent) (Table
3.5.).
Coffee is extremely sensitive to weather conditions,
i.e. frost and drought in the producing countries, especially
in Brazil. These two weather factors have immensely influenced
the supply of coffee over the years and subsequently prices
and the revenues of the producers.
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TABLE 3.2. WORLD COFFEE PRODUCTION (1,000 60-kg. bags)
Crop Year Arabica Robusta Other Total
1960/61 52,415 12,719 235 65,369
1961/62 64,125 11,562 248 75,935
1962/63 53,461 14,066 253 67,780
1963/64 49,005 16,069 245 65,320
1964/65 38,407 13,978 256 52,641
1965/66 65,646 16,226 265 82,137
1966/67 47,856 15,210 267 63,333
1967/68 52,974 17,869 268 71,112
1968/69 44,807 18,152 267 63,226
1969/70 51,033 18,285 274 69,592
1970/71 41,570 17,550 258 59,378
1971/72 55,087 17,941 252 73,280
1972/73 57,270 19,746 221 77, 237
1973/74 46,095 19,387 228 65,710
1974/75 63,146 19,302 245 82,693
1975/76 55,509 17,305 249 73,062
1976/77 42,944 17,885 238 61,067
1977/78 54,406 16,089 201 70,696
1978/79 59,888 18,884 206 78,978
1979/80 62,270 19,292 227 81,789
1980/81 68,264 22,760 237 86,261
1981/82 75,216 22,734 239 98,189
1982/83 59,342 22,338 237 81,917
1983/84 71,127 17,122 246 88,495
1984/85 65,454 26,061 252 91,767
1985/86 72,121 24,071 255 96,447
1986/87 56,800 25,859 276 82,935
Source: USDA Horticultural and Tropical Products
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TABLE 3.3. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD COFFEE PRODUCTION
BY SPECIE
Crop Year Production Arabica Robusta Other1
(1,000 bags) Percent
1960/61 65,374 80.3 19.3 .4
1965/66 82,157 79.9 19.8 .3
1970/71 59,426 70.0 19.5 .5
1975/76 73,109 76.0 23.7 .3
1980/81 86,344 73.3 26.4 .3
1983/84 90,359 78.7 20.9 .4
1984/85 93,608 73.4 26.3 .3
'Mainly Liberica
Source: USDA Horticultural and Tropical Products
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TABLE 3.4. COFFEE, CREENl TOTAL PRODUCTION IN SPECIFIED COUNTRIES
AVERACE 1977/78, ANNUAL 1982/83-1986/87
(IN THOUSANDS OF 60 KILO 8ACS)
RECION AND COUNTRY
AVFMACE
1977/78-1981/82
NORTH AMERICA,
CENTRAL AMERICA 4 CARIBBEANl
COSTARICA 1.7" 1.300 !<"<> »»» '•"« !'™
CUM 317 300 385 325 375 350
DOMINICAN IFF 941 1.100 810 909 780 910
EL SALVADOR 3,074 3.800 2.400 2.480 2,225 2,J'S
cuatemala..! mm »."o '.» '{" »•«» "?»
MI TI 518 874 830 591 579 833
HONDURAS 1,«« l.*» 1.310 1.800 1.088 1.800
Jamaica 23 30 25 15 31 33
MEnco 3.737 4,330 8.530 4,250 4,480 4,860
NICARAGUA 975 1.257 710 800 700 675
PANAMA 115 138 150 201 225 250
TRINIDAD-TOBACO 41 23 30 30 35 30
UNITED STATES 207 267 101 2" Hi Hi
TOTAL NORTH AMERICA 15,504 17,449 15.391 16^710 14^921 16J25
SOOTH AMERICA!
,,„ , _ A . , n
BOLIVIA 130 155 ISO 140 150
ISO
BRAZIL 22,800 17,750 30,000 27,000 33,000 13.900
Colombia!.;.! u.s'i «•» 13.000 11.000 12,000 12.400
eSaDO, 1.398 1.800 1.380 1.S0O 1.997 2,100
niTANA 22 21 17 13 11 H
farJcu;;::::::::::::::::: u» 271 no »o i» 250
Peru 1.143 1,100 1,270 1.1S0 1.250 1,300
VENEZUELA 1.064 791 1.025 lj213 992 1^100
TOTAL SOOTH AMERICA.... 39.717 35.188 47.122 42.258 49,676 31,212
'"'aJcOIA 554 330 260 260 250 250
BENIN 17 50 55 55
ImLiL 437 340 593 460 550 500
!„Zok 1.675 1.830 1.000 2.316 1,601 2.025
mum 54 W " " ** 5
c™E°D:-iOoi,E::::::::::: *.«. 4.510 mm ..«, 4.,,, 4.700
gSS^^r.::::::::: ...S >.>» >.£ «.•« >•« >•»;
s- 32 n j; 5 " s
SHJi !' 80 63 50 30 85 60
SSI* 1 475 1.541 2.000 1.493 2.087 2.000
SSii 153 - 159 «0 215 70 105
gSjJcii::::::::::::::: m»j ..050 ,..n ..200 >.,g ..250
„,,;„!»" 49 45 42 48 50 50
RWANDA*:::.. W »» '" 5.2 600 600
SIERRA LEONE 160 ,231 180 200 145
TAN7ANIA 894 1.033 843 695 900 SO
Torn 152 284 275 215 275 275
J££DA 1 2,186 J, 000 2.700 2.800 1.700 3,000
Z.,.1 1.338 1.354 1,350 1.S40 1.600 1.620
£i,;. 2 3 7 10 13 16
E*S,i,UI ::::: 7 ( mi i« .« _im m
totaj. inia............ -TBJ98 .oTosi 167120 20.046 2Q.SI1 !U!!
""'India 2.177 2.170 1.667 ' 3.250 2.033 2.700
mwi: : : 4.930 4,750 ».ni >,.« s.™ s.™
MAIAY9IA 116 143 154 160 150 ISO
a""";;;:::::::::::::: «5 >.i» »» >.» ••;; '•«;
H-- : s .; 3 » S 13ir::::::::::::::::: 3 '" ]" " "» 1
TOTALui;::::::::::::. -»n»s 6.793 a,84i gag 2^2 ^^m
OCEANIAl 6 6 6
HEW CALEDONIA ' '
-,, ,00
PAPUA-N. CUINEA 809 648 939
m
«|| 222
TOTAL OCEANIA 818 854 943 780
879 ?08
WORLD TOTAL »5,222 «."» •"» M '"' "•"' "*"
l/ Coffa. SfMIW j..r beiln. a6o„t OttoOar l„ aoaa ci.uiU, and April or Julp U othara. 2/ 132.276 pound..
NOTE: Production aacl&ataa for ao«a couotrlaa tocluda croaa-border Mm«iti.
SOORCE: Praparad ot aadaacad oo tha baala o( official acatlatlca of foral«o Rovanuaaota, othar for.lRn aourca
aat.rlal, raporta of U.S. Airlcoltocal Attach.a aod PoralRO Sar.laa offlcata. taaolta of offlaa
ra.aa.cb, and
ralated Intonation.
Jaoua 198; For, Ian ProduCtloo EaClaata Dlvlaloa,
FAS/USDA
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TABLE 3.5. 1HWIT5 it iwoitihc mekbms »«ok all sonnets
ocToat>-nmMK> i9!0/ai to ml/11
(000 bill)
laportiag Kaabar
Octobar-Saptaaber
1980/81 1981/62 1982/83 1983/64 l»«*/»5 I9S5/B6
59 390 SO 884 62 3S] S3 337 6* 14! 66 866*
U.S.A. 18 005 IS 623 IS 479 19 629
19 527 21 090
I.I.C. 28 T28 29 294 30 7 56
29 695 30 8S9 30 969
lalgiua/Luiaabourg 1 983 1 764 1 842 1 952 2 125 1 S94 1/
Denmark 1 136 1 110 1 024 1 007
987 1 015
Tranca 5 800 3 7S3 5 974 5 696 5 832
5 477
tongar, *•* °' 8 56! 9 123 9 240 9 209
9 006 9 491
Graaca 434 448 454
45! 53) 424 1/
Inland 65 71 || 9! MO
114
Italy 3 838 4 056 4 099 3 790
4 49 7 4 663
rfatharlanda 2 720 2 550 2 813 2 647 2
815 2 763
Portugal 108 249 300 J16 330
346 1/
Spain 1 316 1 577 2 286 1 966 1 886 2 165 2/
Unitad Kingdoa 2 461 2 564 2 645 2 558 2 766 2 617 1/
Other iaportini I
Au»c ra 1 is
Austria
Canada
Cyprus
Fiji
r inland
Japan
Haw Zealand
Norway
Singapore
Sweden
SwitiarlintJ
Yugoslavia
646 12 5 69 6 679 !H5 66!
III 1 039 1 150 1 040 1 067 1 IS3
1 994 1 875 1 806 1 S40 1 SSI 1 966 2/
37 3) 39 9! 33 30 2/
3 3 ] 2 1 1
89 5 1 |!8 1 010 1 072 1 132 816
3 200 3 49 3 3 772 4 28 7 4 130 4 369
110 105 122 112 III 103
713 744 711 794 !09 146
693 4/ 492 4/ 638 4/ 980 921 1 134 4/
1 632 1 747 1 639 1 717 1 646 1 622 2/
1 09! 1 017 1 039 1 035 1 133 1 163
!86 517 499 36 3 151 140
Due Co rounding the total* aay not always reflect the iua of the relevant cooponencs
* Frol iainory
1/ Estimated
2/ Includes estimates provided by the Neaber
3/ Froviaional
4/ Includes estimated iaports froa Indonesia
Source: ICO
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Statiittcs on Coffse
International Coffee Organization
World coffee production averaged 32.6 million bags
from 1950 to 1955 (USDA estimates) . Coffee prices were very
high following World War II, causing massive coffee tree
planting following the war and in the early 1950s. By the
early 1960s, these plantings came to full production,
overflooding the market and pushing coffee prices down.
World coffee production reached 65.4 million bags in
marketing year 1960/61 which was double the 1950 to 1955
average. Production reached a peak of 82.2 million bags in
1965-66. After 1965, production trended downward to 58.9
million bags in 1970/71 but rebounded to 82 million bags again
in 1974/75. Production has remained at 80 million bags or more
each year since 1980. The highest annual world production was
recorded in 1982 with world production of 98 million bags
(Table 3.6.). In ten years, 1977 through 1986, annual world
production varied from 70.7 million bags to 98.2 million with
an average of 85.4 million bags.
Coffee is mainly traded as green beans to be
transformed into roasted coffee, ground coffee, and soluble
coffee (i.e. instant coffee) by the importer. Soluble coffee
is gaining popularity and some exporters have engaged in
processing but it still accounts for less than 5 percent of
the total producers' exports (Table 3.6.). In 1986/87, soluble
exports accounted for 4.3 percent of total coffee exports,
compared to only 1.8 percent, eighteen years ago in 1968/69.
There is potential for an enlarged share of the soluble coffee
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market by the exporters if some existing trade barriers in the
importing countries were lowered.
3.2.2. Trends in World Coffee Consumption
The demand for coffee is concentrated in the
developed countries with the U.S.A. and the European Economic
Community (EEC) as the largest consumers. Coffee is mainly
consumed as a beverage and has a very low price demand
elasticity. Price demand elasticity averaged -0.219 over the
1950 to the estimated 1985 period in the U.S.A. (Singh et al.)
at seventy cents per pound in 1967 terms. Coffee consumption
is considered a habit and represents a very low share of
consumer income. Elasticity of demand with respect to income
varied from 0.006 in 1975 to 0.001 in 1985 (Singh et al.). The
decline in income demand elasticity is linked to saturation
level supposedly attained by coffee consumers.
3.2.2.1. In the U.S.A.
According to the USDA, U.S. coffee consumption was
nearly 62 percent of world production in the 1950s. However,
by 1965, that consumption dropped to 47.0 percent and is
estimated today at 33 percent of world production. In fact,
consumption in the U.S. has been declining for the past
twenty-five years and a study by ICO (International Coffee
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Organization) revealed that in 1986, per capita consumption
was 1.74 cups per day compared to 1.83 cups in 1985 and 3.12
cups in 1962. The proportion of the population drinking coffee
decreased from 54.9 percent in 1985 to 52.4 percent in 1986,
while the cups consumed per drinker remained virtually
unchanged (Table 3.7.).
The USDA relates the initial decreases in the U.S.
coffee consumption to the high retail coffee prices during the
early 1950s. That brought major shifts in consumer tastes, and
the introduction of soluble coffee further reinforced the
decline in per capita green bean consumption. Soluble coffee
was substituted for regular coffee and went from 10 percent of
total consumption in 1953 to 21 percent in 1965 (USDA) . In
1965 solubles were yielding seventy cups per pound of coffee,
compared with only 51.5 cups for regular coffee, hence their
increased share of total consumption. On the other hand,
soluble coffee suffered most of the decline occurring in U.S.
coffee consumption in 1986. Today, regular coffee continues to
be the type most frequently consumed by U.S. drinkers,
accounting for nearly eight out of ten cups consumed (Table
3.7.) .
3.2.2.2. In the Rest of the World
The EEC stands first in world coffee consumption
with 48 percent of world imports. Although there is variation
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TABLE 3.7. COFFEE CONSUMPTION IN THE U.S.A.
Rate ot Oonsump
: 1962
:ion
1984 1985 1986
Cups per person
per day
Cups per drinker
per day
3.12
4.17
1.99
3.48
1.83
3.33
1.74
3.32
Source: ICO
Percentage Drinki nc
TYPE : 1962 1984 1985 1986
: 74.7 57.3
39.4
22.5
54.9
39.1
19.4
52.4
: 59.3 39.0
: 23.5 16.4
SOURCE: ICO
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in individual EEC member coffee import performance, there has
been a slight increase in the whole EEC import in general
(Table 3.8.)- The United Kingdom, where coffee is competing
with tea as the national beverage, and West Germany have seen
their imports rise remarkably these last years.
In general, in most western European countries, the
growth of coffee consumption is slowing down as saturation
levels are about to be reached. On the other hand, potentials
for consumption growth exist in other parts of the world, like
Japan and Eastern Europe, and offer new markets for the coffee
producing countries.
3.2.3. Coffee Exports and National Economies
In the producing countries, coffee is a major part
of the gross national product (GNP) and as an export product,
it is one of the main sources of foreign exchange earnings.
For example, in 1978, USDA data show coffee representing 15.4
percent of Brazil's total exports, 65.2 percent for Colombia,
and 25 percent for Cote d'lvoire (Table 3.9.).
According to Singh et al. and based on 1970-72 data,
eighteen 1 countries depended on coffee for more than 2 5
percent of their foreign exchange earnings and "in 1972-74,
^•Portuguese Timor, Burundi, Uganda, Colombia, Rwanda,
Ethiopia, Haiti, El Salvador, Yemen, Guatemala, Cote
d'lvoire, Angola, Costa Rica, Brazil, Equatorial Guinea,
Kenya, Madagascar, Cameroon
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TABLE 3.8. INDEX OF IMPORTS
OCTOBER-SEPTEMBER 1979/1980 = 100
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84
EEC 105 100 106 107 111 108
of which
France 105 100 103 103 106 101
West Germany 100 100 107 114 116 115
halv 97 100 101 107 108 100
U.K. 131 100 108 112 116 112
Source: African Coffee. November 1985
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TABIJ2 3.9. COFFEE: EXPORT VAIDE AS PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS, 1974-78
(In percent)
Continent and country 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
North America
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
South
Brazil
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Venezuela
Africa
Cameroon
Ethiopia
CSte d'lvoire
Kenya
Madagascar
Tanzania
Uganda
Asia and Oceania
India
Indonesia
28.3 19.6 26.0 39.2 35.2
5.9 3.9 12.4 21.7 13.1
41.5 32.9 52.9 62.0 34.2
30.2 26.3 32.0 44.3 —
33.6 22.8 37.4 44.4 —
16.7 19.3 25.6 33.3 35.4
5.4 6.4 12.0 10.5 6.2
12.1 9.8 22.0 31.2 30.9
10.9 9.9 21.5 19.0 15.4
43.9 45.8 55.4 61.6 65.2
6.0 6.5 15.3 13.1 18.8
2.3 3.9 8.5 11.7 9.1
0.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 —
24.8 19.4 36.3 34.0 29.7
27.8 34.0 56.7 75.5 72.9
26.7 29.6 33.8 37.5 25.0
23.6 20.9 34.7 42.5 33.7
26.7 22.3 42.9 48.8 —
14.8 19.0 33.6 41.0 35.8
73.3 77.8 85.8 92.8 —
1.9 1.5 1.7 2.5 3.6
1.3 1.4 2.8 5.5 4.2
—Denotes unknown
Source: January 1980, Commodity Programs, EAS/USDA
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when the total export earnings of developing countries for
primary commodities other than oil were estimated at
approximately $47,000 million, the value of their exports of
coffee was $3,700 million," i.e. 7.8 percent.
All of the coffee export dependent countries are
developing countries with many of them having annual per
capita incomes of less than $200 and low rates of growth of
gross national product (GNP) . Latin America is the dominant
coffee producer with 60 percent of world production, Africa
accounts for 30 percent, and Asia and Oceania produce the
remaining 10 percent. Currently, total coffee exports are
about $13 billion a year (ICO data) for over 66 million bags
sold.
Instability in the revenues of the coffee producing
countries is to be attributed not only to the fluctuations in
the price of coffee exports but to the volumes exported as
well. For many coffee producing countries, coffee represents a
high proportion of total exports, making the producers more
vulnerable to the disturbances in the market which will have a
negative impact on their domestic economy.
Between 1950 and 1970, world coffee production grew
at a rate of just under 3 percent a year but the real value of
coffee grew by only 0.6 percent a year, according to FAO data.
Following the sharp rise in prices after World War II, massive
new plantings took place and by 1960, the coffee market was
over-supplied and prices fell drastically. However, in the
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1950s as a whole, production had already expanded by about 7 5
percent (Singh et al.). The growth in world coffee exports
followed a somewhat similar pattern owing very much to stocks
held in producing countries to match demand. Thus, coffee
stocks rose continuously until 1966 and as production fell
later in the 1960s, due to the diversification policies
pursued by Brazil, stocks were intensively used and declined
rapidly. Prices which had begun to recover slowly, boosted
suddenly as Brazil experienced a severe frost in 1975. It
should be noted that large stocks of coffee were in existence
in the producing countries throughout the 1960s and in 1966
total producer stocks reached a peak of 86 million bags, equal
to nearly two years of world import demand (Table 3.6).
In general, coffee can be stored for two to three
years with only a marginal deterioration in quality. In hot
and humid climates, air-conditioned warehouses are required
for storage. In general, coffee could be considered a
continuously storable commodity although coffee that has been
in storage for five years or more has always been diverted to
the domestic market especially in Brazil, while the more
recent growths are used for exports. All the producing
countries, with the exception of Brazil, export almost all of
the coffee they grow. Consequently the shares of most
countries in the world export market roughly correspond to
their shares in total production. In the particular case of
Brazil, up to 1973, the world's largest producer was able to
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maintain a 3 percent share in the export market despite its
smaller share (20 percent) in the world exportable production
(i.e. production minus domestic consumption) because of its
stock-holding policy.
Value increased as volume increased but at a lower
rate and influenced the movement of world export value. Export
unit values reached a high in the mid-1950s, declined rapidly
toward the early 1960s, and have grown since at a somewhat
irregular pace, on the average more or less reflecting the
growth in export volume (Table 3.10.). Generally, the gain in
export earnings has come from larger volumes rather than from
higher unit values. Real prices of coffee, deflated by the
1980 IMF (International Monetary Fund) index of consumer
prices in the industrial countries, increased rapidly after
World War II. When consumption was higher than production and
stocks were reduced to their lowest point in the early 1950s,
prices rose to a peak of 258 cents per pound in 1956 on the
New York spot market for Colombian coffee. Thereafter, prices
began to decline when large supplies, triggered by the high
prices, came on the market and stocks began to increase
dramatically. Prices reached a low of 124 cents in 1962 one
year before the International Coffee Agreeement (ICA) came
into effect. With the establishment of the ICA, all the
producers were hoping to see prices rise again as a
consequence of the export controls. Their expectations were
realized when prices increased to 141 cents in 1964 despite
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TABLE 3.10. INDEXES OP VALUE AND VOLUME OP WORLD COPPEE EXPORTS
PROM PRODDCING COUNTRIES, 1959-70
(1960 = 100)
Year World Central America South America Africa
Value of Coffee Exports
Asia & Oceania
1959 102 90
1960 100 100
1961 97 90
1962 98 99
1963 105 93
1964 126 116
1965 117 118
1966 126 121
1967 119 104
1968 135 114
1969 129 114
1970 124 117
105 103 116
100 100 100
97 96 133
94 107 128
101 120 171
111 172 179
103 152 181
106 182 209
101 170 269
117 191 251
111 182 254
101 159 256
Volume of Coffee Exports
1959 102 92
1960 100 100
1961 103 98
1962 105 112
1963 lie 106
1964 109 111
1965 105 109
1966 118 115
1967 121 111
1968 129 124
1969 128 119
1970 168 130
105 102 93
100 100 100
100 103 131
102 99 161
113 122 206
95 133 145
87 133 187
100 147 202
103 142 286
112 158 216
112 154 245
126 218 352
Source: Trade yearbooks 1952-69, Vol. 8-24, Rome Italy. USDA "World
Demand Prospects for Coffee in 1970," Daniel Timms.
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still existing large coffee stocks. However, prices eventually
fell again to low levels at the discovery of ample coffee
supply and in 1968, real prices were even lower than their
1962 level (Table 3.11.).
It is that erratic movement of prices characteristic
of the coffee market over the years that has almost "forced"
the producers to organize themselves. The creation of the
International Coffee Organization (ICO) in late 1962 was a
result of the willingness to join marketing efforts to solve
the coffee problem.
3.3. World Coffee Organization and Marketing
In search of solutions to halt the decline in the
coffee industry, the producers came to associate within the
International Coffee Organization (ICO)
.
However, several other regional and inter-regional
producers' organizations had preceded ICO in an attempt to
solve the coffee problem with more or less success and remain
of historical importance.
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3.3.1. Regional Organizations
3.3.1.1. In Latin America
In May 1955, the International Coffee Bureau was
formed by 15 Western Hemisphere nations and the Belgian Congo.
Its main purpose was to study price stabilization methods.
In October 1957, the Mexico City Agreement was
signed by FEDECAME (Federation Cafetaria Centro-Americano-
Mexico et Caraibe) , members of which are fourteen coffee
producing countries of Central America, Mexico, and Caraibe.
The attempt to limit exports in order to influence coffee
prices failed.
In June 1958, the Coffee Study Group was established
by thirty producing and consuming nations in Rio de Janeiro
(Brazil) to seek a solution to the worsening surplus problem.
In October 1958, a short-term (one-year) coffee
agreement was signed as a follow-up, incorporating provisions
for export retention. However, this agreement also was a
failure.
In October 1959, the Latin American group of
producers opened their activities to African producers willing
to accept quota restrictions.
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3.3.1.2. In Africa
In December 1960, shortly after the former French
and British colonies emerged as independent countries, ten
African producers met in Antanarivo (Madagascar) to set the
bases of IACO (InterAfrican Coffee Organization) . IACO is in
many regards similar to FEDECAME and has a membership of
twenty-five countries.
Later on, the seven2 IACO Francophone members
created an organization called OAMCAF (Organization Africaine
et Mauricienne du Cafe) . All the seven countries speak the
same official language (French) and belong to the same
monetary zone (franc) . The main purpose of OAMCAF is to
coordinate marketing strategies of member countries and to
stand as a unique and unified member of the international
organizations, sharing a global quota level and adopting a
common position on issues before the organization.
All these regional and multinational associations
finally led the way to a greater, world-wide organization for
a smoother and more general coffee policy.
2The seven members are: Benin, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Congo, Cote d'lvoire, Gabon, and Madagascar.
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3.3.2. The ICO
The ICO is a world-wide coffee organization of
seventy-five producing and consuming countries. The fifty
exporting countries account for 99 percent of the world
production and the twenty-five importing countries represent
about 90 percent of world coffee consumption (Appendix B of
list of members)
.
3.3.2.1. ICAs and Coffee Marketing
The first International Coffee Agreement (ICA) was
signed in New York in 1962 and started an era of control of
the coffee industry by the organization. The latest ICA, which
should remain in force until September 30, 1989, was signed in
1983 and has the following principal features as defined by
the elected coffee board:
(a) A system of export quotas may operate if necessary to
secure stability of price within ranges agreed upon
annually by exporting and importing members at meetings
of the International Coffee Council.
(b) Quotas may be suspended if prices rise above certain
levels and be subsequently reintroduced if prices fall.
The reference level is the ICO "indicator price" based on
the New York, German, French, and British exchange
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prices. The composite indicator refers to the mix of both
Arabica and Robusta prices.
It has been agreed to use 15-day running averages of the
composite indicator as a trigger for making the changes in the
quotas.
If the indicator falls to an agreed level as shown by
the 15-day average, the quota is cut by the agreed amount
(perhaps a million bags, perhaps more) . If the 15-day
average reaches a higher trigger, the quota is increased
to restrain the upward price movement. (Marshall, p. 111).
Appendix C explains the 15-day running average of the ICO
(c) The quota system operates in such a way that
consideration is given to past performance and to the
stocks of coffee held in exporting members' countries.
The size of the overall quota is fixed each September for
the ensuing year, as from October 1, and adjustments
apply as the year goes on and given the market supply
conditions.
Conflicts over the size of market shares have already arisen
as new producers are willing to expand their market share in
the face of greater prices and new demand (e.g., Robusta for
soluble coffee) in the oligopolistic coffee market (Table
3.12.)
.
3.3.2.2. ICA and Coffee Prices
The main objective of the ICO remains the
stabilization of world coffee prices by pursuit of an export
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TABLE 3.12. COFFEE YEAR 1984/85
ANNUAL QUOTAS REFLECTING QUOTA INCREASE WITHDRAWAL
OF JULY 4, 1985
(in bags of 60 kilos)
Exporting Member
TOTAL
Sub-total: Members entitled
to a basic quota
Colombian Milds
Colombia
Kenya
Tanzania
Other Milds
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
India
Mexico
Nicaragua
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Brazil and Other Arabicas
Brazil
Ethiopia
Robustas
Angola
Indonesia
OAMCAF
Benin
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Congo
Gabon
Ivory Coast
Madagascar
Togo
Philipines
Uganda
Zaire
Sub-total: Members exempt
from basic quotas
Revised Annual Quota
59,155,500
56,220,678
10,950,831
8,858,421
1,351,005
741,405
12,849,221
1,220,265
516,238
1,180,756
2,438,400
1,889,211
857,800
700,503
1,988,065
697,470
646,567
713,946
18,227,724
16,777,729
1,449,995
14,192,902
270,000
2,501,843
(7,237,551)
55,529
1,488,303
281,160
42,211
42,211
4,217,773
801,817
308,547
488,778
2,516,432
1,178,298
2,934,822
Source: ICO
* = " Quota Increase Withdrawal" refers to in-year
adjustments in members quotas.
Numbers in the Table are members final quotas for 1985.
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quota policy. The successive ICAs have helped to keep the
prices at a certain level over the years but could not always
prevent fluctuations due to certain exogenous variables.
In the years preceding the 1962 ICA, i.e., the
second half of the 1950s and early 1960s, the coffee market
was oversupplied and prices were very low. Then came the first
ICA in 1963 and prices remained stable from 1964 to 1972 with
production and consumption fairly balanced (Table 3.11.).
But when the prices of all primary commodities
including coffee rose again in 1973, there was a collapse of
quotas. In 1975, prices went up again following a frost in
Brazil and a provision in the agreement was called for
allowing for quota suspension and greater flexibility in the
quota system to take into account market conditions and
especially strong pressure on prices. This provision is still
used and has made the ICA more flexible for producers.
Despite the presence of the ICAs, there is still
substantial seasonal price variation as can be substantiated
by the ICO composite monthly indicator prices from 1975 to
1986. (Appendix D) . Generally, a major weather event (frost or
drought) in Brazil will have the consumers scared and will
subsequently drive prices up the following months as in August
1975, September 1978, July 1979, August 1981, and in October
1985. Eventually, prices will fall back as stock held in the
producing countries prevent supply from decreasing. (Figure
3.1.). Overall, yearly price fluctuations remained great over
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FIGURE 3.1. COMPOSITE INDICATOR PRICES
MONTHLY AVERAGES SINCE 1975
(IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT TERMS)
US ctnu per lb.
k. j s
' m J s I m j sImjsimjsImjs ImjsImj sImjs Imjs |mjs|mjsDDDDDOO OOOD
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 I960 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
NOTE: (1) Prices refer to average of Other Mildi and RobuMM up to September 1976. Compoiite Indicator
Prices 1976 up to Septtmbef 1981 and Compojite Indicator Price 1979 thereafter.
(2) Prieti in conitant termi refer to price* in current terms deflated by the U.N. index of unit values
of expom of manufactured goodi from developed market economies. (Bate: April-June 1980- 100).
Source: ICO: Coffee Statistics
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the seasons. Thus, the yearly average prices as reported in
Appendix D for the seven years of the ICO data, showed a
coefficient of variation of 34.29 percent. Within a single
year, the variations were as high as 25.3 percent in 1975 or
as low as 2.5 percent in 1984.
The indexes of seasonal variation (Table 3.13.)
calculated from Appendix D ICO deflated prices, prove that
there exist a seasonality in coffee prices. From January to
June, prices are higher than the annual average (100)
.
However, prices below the annual average are observed through
the remaining months of the year before stabilizing at the
median in December. Despite the presence of seasonality,
coffee prices show a certain irregularity (see Index Table
3.13.) and fluctuate within a very large band (>12 percent).
That band around the index of seasonal variation is made of an
upper and lower price limits and will contain approximately 68
percent of the variation which could normally be expected to
occur in the price series. The possibility of large
fluctuations in coffee prices makes therefore any price
forecasting a hazardous task for the coffee producer.
Thus, the coffee agreements and the ICO in general
cannot control the volatility of coffee cash prices when
exogenous factor such as weather is the disturbing element.
Coffee is a commodity that faces inelastic demand, with an
almost oligopolistic market. Brazil is indeed the largest
producer and the leader followed by many small producers.
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TABLE 3.13. INDEX OF SEASONAL VARIATION AND
INDEX OF IRREGULARITY IN COFFEE
PRICES 1975-1986
in percent
Index of Index of Upper Lower Difference
Month Seasonal Irregularity Limit Limit (l)-(2)
Variat ion (1) (2)
Jan 100.9 7.0 107.9 93.9 14.0
Feb 101.4 7.5 108.9 93.9 15.0
Mar 103.5 9.0 112.5 94.5 18.0
Apr 103.9 7.5 111.4 96.4 15.0
May 103.1 6.9 110.0 96.2 13.8
Jun 102.2 11.2 113.4 91.0 22.4
Jul 95.2 6.1 101.3 89.1 12.2
Aug 96.7 8.9 105.6 87.8 17.8
Sep 97.6 11.4 109.0 86.2 22.8
Oct 97.5 11.7 109.2 85.8 23.4
Nov 98.0 9.5 107.5 88.5 19.0
Dec 100.0 6.3 106.3 93.7 12.6
Source: Price data from ICO Coffee Statistics.
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Given these facts, agreements designed to stabilize prices
through export quotas may be difficult to implement.
Therefore, control and cooperation to avoid cheating is
necessary and costly.
The obstacles (high volatility of the market, low
supply and demand elasticity, high cheating tendency) to be
defeated by the ICO are indeed great. That is why other coffee
marketing techniques by LDCs ought to be considered. Futures
markets and available instrument such as hedging seem good
additional strategies to reduce price fluctuations within a
marketing year and will be explored in the next chapter.
An optimal hedging strategy that could be used by a
typical LDC coffee exporter (Cote d'lvoire) for income
stabilization purposes will thus be analyzed.
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Chapter 4
Coffee and Cote d'lvoire
Cote d'lvoire (formerly Ivory Coast) is a developing
country on the West African coast. A former French colony, it
became independent in 1960 and has its economy based on
agriculture and in particular the export of coffee and cocoa.
Coffee was introduced in Cote d'lvoire by a
Frenchman named Verdier in the mid-nineteenth century. First
produced to satisfy the French colonial government, coffee
has become, since the country's independence, the primary
source of foreign exchange earnings and thus plays an
important role in Cote d'lvoire's economy.
4.1. Production
Robusta coffee is the only variety grown in Cote
d'lvoire. It is sensitive to weather as well as diseases.
Coffee exports started in Cote d'lvoire in 1913 under the
colonial government and expanded rapidly after the country's
independence in 1960.
Wickizer (1943) reported that Cote d'lvoire is a
good example of the rapidity with which the area under coffee
can be increased. "In 1927-28 only 5,000 hectares were
reported as devoted to coffee cultivation, but by 1936-37
this figure had increased to 104,000 hectares." That rapid
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growth is to be attributed to the great amount of virgin land
available at that period for expansion of coffee plantations.
The growth in the country's coffee production has
nevertheless been steady except during the 1961-62, 1966-67,
and 1983-84 seasons when productions dropped because of bad
weather (Table 4.1.)- However, the short-run supply
elasticity in Cote d'lvoire as a mature producer is at 0.16
calculated for this study over twenty-three from FAO data and
reflects the low world coffee supply elasticity in general.
Production comes mostly from smallholders.
Today, Cote d'lvoire is the third largest coffee
producer in the world after Brazil and Colombia as well as
the largest producer of Robusta in Africa. The country
produces over 4 million bags of coffee annually. Such an
important producer could not be left out of any international
marketing arrangement and therefore Cote d'lvoire is a member
of the International Coffee Organization, member of OAMCAF
(Organization Africaine and Mauricienne du Cafe) , which is a
sub-member of IACO (InterAfrican Coffee Organization) . In
that respect, the country's coffee production is regulated by
quota levels set by ICO members (Table 4.2.).
Cote d'lvoire coffee exports in 1987-88 are
estimated at 4.5 million bags, about 500,000 bags above the
1986-87 level. Exports are mainly green beans; soluble
exports average 5 percent while roast/ground coffee is one
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TABLE 4.2. INITIAL AND FINAL ANNUAL EXPORT ICO QUOTAS
OF COTE D'lVOIRE
Year Initial Annual
Quota
(60 kilo bags)
Final Annual
Quota
(60 kilo bags)
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
3,521,222
4,147,609
4,015,697
4,031,519
4,362,816
4,128,192
3,017,184
4,147,602
3,786,516
4,220,908
4,152,410
4,512,192
Source: ICO Statistics on Coffee
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percent of total exports. Stocks have also always been in
existence and were evaluated at 1.2 million bags in 1986
(Table 4.3.) .
Less than 5 percent of the coffee produced by Cote
d'lvoire is consumed locally. Therefore, almost the total
production is exported to generate the revenues that the
country is in need of for development purposes.
4.2. Exports and Revenues
At the time of the country's political independence
in 1960, coffee exports represented 50 percent of Cote
d'lvoire's total exports (USDA) . In 1979, the Central Bank of
the States of West Africa estimated that the two main Cote
d'lvoire export commodities, coffee and cocoa, accounted for
63 percent of the country's earnings, with 32.4 percent
coming from coffee exports alone. Today, coffee still remains
important for the Ivorian economy, accounting for 25 percent
of total exports.
The revenues generated by coffee sales remain,
however, as variable as the fluctuations in either export
prices or the exportable volume. In general, the increase in
export revenues has been linked more to an increase in the
volumes exported than to an increase in international coffee
prices. Real prices fluctuated significantly with a standard
deviation of 50.35 from the mean from 1961 to 1983 (data
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Table 4.4.) with a coefficient of variation of 43.46 percent
for the twenty-three years, pointing out the great
fluctuations in the prices over the years (Figure 4.1.).
Exports and real revenues have been, on the other hand, found
to be highly correlated at +.7 6 (Figure 4.2.).
Cote d'lvoire sells its coffee mainly in green beans
to developed countries who are members of ICO. Her major
trading partners are France, the United States, Italy, and
the Netherlands. The demand elasticity remains very low at
-0.29 (calculated from FAO data). The domestic coffee
marketing system in Cote d'lvoire is fairly well developed as
the country exports about 95 percent of its production.
4.3. Marketing of Coffee in Cote d'lvoire
4.3.1. Coffee Preparation for the Market
Coffee is originally bought directly from the small
grower or from a cooperative of which the small producer is a
member. The commodity is purchased by a local merchant on
behalf of a local exporter at the guaranteed producer price.
After the coffee has been dried, ripened, cleaned,
and sorted either manually by the farmer or electronically in
the newly installed plants, it is transported to Abidjan, the
main port. The Ivorian coffee travels mainly in trucks and a
small percentage is carried by train from the producing
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TAELE 4.4. Cote D'TVDIRE COFFEE: PRICES, VOLUME EXPORTED AND EXPORT
EXPORT EARNINGS.
YEAR PIR PIA VE INDEX3 CPIlP CPIAb EE CEEb
1961 30.5 36.0 2.6 32.1 95.0 112.1 0.8 2.5
1962 30.9 34.0 2.7 32.9 93.9 103.3 0.8 2.5
1963 28.2 34.1 2.6 33.8 83.4 100.9 0.7 2.2
1964 35.9 46.7 3.6 34.6 103.8 135.0 1.3 3.7
1965 31.4 44.7 2.7 35.6 88.2 125.6 0.8 2.4
1966 35.5 40.8 2.9 36.9 96.2 110.6 1.0 2.8
1967 35.0 37.8 2.7 38.0 92.1 99.5 0.9 2.5
1968 33.6 37.4 3.3 39.4 85.3 94.9 1.1 2.8
1969 33.6 40.8 2.9 41.3 81.4 98.8 0.9 2.4
1970 41.8 54.6 3.1 43.6 95.9 125.2 1.3 3.0
1971 40.8 44.8 3.3 45.9 88.9 97.6 1.3 2.9
1972 44.9 51.0 3.7 48.0 93.5 106.2 1.7 3.5
1973 51.3 66.9 3.5 51.7 99.2 129.4 1.8 3.5
1974 57.2 68.1 4.4 58.6 97.6 116.2 2.5 4.3
1975 61.1 82.8 3.5 65.1 93.9 127.2 2.1 3.3
1976 127.9 149.8 5.4 70.5 181.4 212.5 6.9 9.8
1977 224.3 308.6 4.5 76.4 293.6 403.9 10.1 13.2
1978 147.8 165.6 3.7 81.9 180.5 202.2 5.5 6.7
1979 165.9 178.9 4.6 89.4 185.6 200.1 7.6 8.5
1980 147.5 209.4 3.2 100.0 147.5 209.4 4.7 4.7
1981 103.2 180.0 3.6 109.9 93.9 163.8 3.7 3.4
1982 111.2 144.8 4.7 118.1 94.2 122.6 5.2 4.4
1983 124.3 143.3 3.9 124.1 100.2 115.5 4.8 3.9
Source : FAO and USDA
PIR = International Robusta Price in U.S. cents per pound
PIA = International Arabica Price in U.S. cents per pound
VE = Volume Exported in million of 60 kg. bags
EE = Export Earnings in million U.S. dollars
a = IMF Index of Consumer Price in Industrial Countries,
1980=100
b = Constant Terms
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regions to the exporters' warehouses. Once in the warehouse,
the coffee is further treated for either export, local usage,
or stock holding.
For export purposes, the coffee is classified in four
grades according to the size of the bean: Grade I (highest)
is screen 16, Grade II is screen 14, III is screen 12, and IV
is screen 10.
On the international market, the Ivorian coffee
popularity is in part due to the supply being in large
parcels of uniform quality: 96-97 percent of the coffee is
grade III.
All the domestic coffee preparation is supervised by
a governmental agency: CSSPPA (Caisse de Stabilization et de
Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles) or Stabilization
Fund.
4.3.2. The Role of the Stabilization Fund
CSSPPA or Stabilization Fund in short, is the
official marketing agent of the Ivorian coffee. It is a
parastatal organization which stabilizes prices on the
domestic level of coffee, cocoa, cotton, and banana. It
guarantees a minimum fixed price to the producer each year
and a CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) price is guaranteed
to the licensed coffee exporter.
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Unlike marketing boards in some other countries, the
Ivorian Stabilization Fund does not get in possession of the
product. It acts as a supervisor of the marketing operation
and issues licenses to exporters. In order to be a legal
exporter, a firm or person must obtain a license from the
Fund. Each exporter is assigned about 2 percent of the
country's total coffee exports. That quota is revised every
year. The exporter may be solely responsible for all the
conditioning and coffee transportation costs up to the
shipping port. If his expenses after all happen to be higher
than the guaranteed export (CIF) price, the exporter will be
refunded by the Stabilization Fund. If the opposite case
occurs (guaranteed price higher) , the exporter makes up the
difference to the Fund. More and more these days, the Fund is
involved actively in the sale of especially large coffee
quantities to the biggest buyers. In that case, the exporter
is just an intermediary between the Fund and the buyer,
following the conditions determined by the Fund.
During good coffee years with high international
coffee prices, the stabilization fund generates a surplus
which is expected to help make up the gap left by bad coffee
years (lower international prices) in the economy. For many
years, the fund surplus came from taxing the farmer by fixing
a minimum price lower than the world price. Although the
coffee grower in Cote d'lvoire saw the guaranteed price rise
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every year, it was still very much lower than the world price
applied to the fund.
Table 4.5. shows some order of difference between the
international and domestic Robusta prices. The difference
between the fixed producer price (2) and the unit value of
Cote d'lvoire exports (3) is a positive gain for the Ivorian
Stabilization Fund. The revenues generated are supposed to be
used to stabilize the farmer's income when world coffee
prices are very low. However, the fund has been using its
revenues in other sectors of the economy more often than in
agriculture.
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Chapter 5
Futures Markets and Coffee
5.1. General Definition of Futures Market
A futures market is an organized pricing institution.
A well developed futures market approximates closely the
economic concepts of a perfectly competitive market; there
are many buyers and sellers dealing in a standardized
commodity (the futures contract) . Traders do not have perfect
knowledge, but in principle, they have equal access to
available information. In fact, prices and price changes are
public knowledge (Tomek 1981) .
5.1.1. The Futures Contract
A futures contract is a legal contract, enforceable
by the rules of the exchange through a clearinghouse, to
deliver or accept delivery of a definite amount of a
commodity during a specified month at a specified price. The
contract specifies volume, quality, time of delivery,
delivery point, and price. All contracts for a particular
commodity on a given exchange are identical, but contract
specifications may differ from market to market.
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Sale of a futures contract is an obligation to make
delivery to the buyer (quantity, quality, time, and place as
specified by the contract) at the price at which the contract
was sold.
Purchase of a futures contract is an obligation
either to accept delivery of the quantity and quality of
product specified in the contract or to take an offsetting
position in the futures market by selling an identical
contract. The right to buy and sell in the specific market
goes only to members of the exchange. Non-member traders
place orders through a professional broker, who is a member,
at established commission prices. Trade occurs in one
physical place, the floor of the exchange, during the trading
session. The traders cry out bids and offers, making a
bilateral auction market. A principal economic justification
of the futures market remains its price risk reducing
function through hedging.
5.1.2. Hedging
Hedging, put simply, is establishing a position in
futures opposite from the one held in the spot (cash) market.
A selling hedge involves the sale of futures contracts. A
buying hedge refers to the purchase of futures contracts . A
short hedge exists when a producer, trying to reduce price
risk during the production or storage of a commodity, sells
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an equivalent quantity of the commodity in the futures
market. The producer is "short" as he sells contracts not
covered by purchases. He is obliqed to make delivery at the
agreed-upon time at the specified price.
A long hedge refers to the producer or processor
who sets the commodity purchase price in advance by buying
futures contracts. The producer is "long" on futures as he
purchases contracts not covered by sales and is therefore
obliged to accept delivery and pay for the contracted amount
at the specified time. Hedging is possible because of the
relationship that exists between futures prices and cash
prices for the commodity traded. The differential between the
futures and the cash price of the commodity is called the
basis. The basis ordinarily narrows as the delivery month is
approached, and it approaches zero at the delivery point at
the maturity of the contract.
In a perfect hedge, the loss in the cash market is
exactly offset by the gain in the futures market. For
example: Assume, an exporter of coffee (e.g. Cote d'lvoire
Stabilization Fund) buys 375,000 pounds (ten contracts) of
coffee from growers. The Fund would use the futures market
and sell equivalent futures to protect the value of its
purchases from producers and would buy futures to cover its
forward sales to coffee roasters. The exporter may face any
of the three following cases:
68
Date cash
CASE 1: A cash price rise
Jan. 3 Buys 375,000 lbs.
worth $2.12/lb.
Total $795,000
Futures
Sells 375,000 lbs.
March @ $2.14/lb.
Total $802,500
Basis
2ft under
Feb. 1 Sells 375,000 lbs.
@ $2.25/lb.
Total $843,750
Buys 375,000 lbs.
March $2.26
Total $847,500
1ft under
Gross
gain/loss + $.13/lb.
+ $48,750
- $.12/lb.
- $45,000
Net gain =
$3,750 or
$.01/lb.
CASE 2: An exact offset hedae
Jan. 3 Buys 375,000 lbs.
$2.12/lb.
Sells 10 March
futures $2.14
2ft under
Feb. 1 Sells 375,000 lbs.
$2.02
Buys 10 March
futures $2.04
2ft under
Gain/loss - $.10/lb. + $.10/lb. Net gain $0
CASE 3: Cash price falls
Jan. 3 Buys 375,000 lbs.
$2.12/lb.
Sells 10 March
futures $2.14
2ft under
Feb. 1 Sells 375,000 lbs.
$1.88/lb.
Buys 10 March
futures $1.89
1ft under
Gain/loss - $.24/lb. + $.25/lb. Net gain
$.01/lb.
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5.1.2.1. Basis Behavior
In practice, the basis will depend on several
factors. These include:
1. Location relative to the delivery point for the futures
contract.
2. Quality difference between the cash item and the futures
contract specifications, and
3. Storage costs (eventually) that are incurred in the time
period involved before contract maturity.
Fluctuations in the basis are almost invariably
"much less" than fluctuations in commodity prices, explaining
the risk reducing role attributed to a hedge. However, the
possibility of adverse price movements for either long or
short futures positions exists and that is why traders are
required to make a margin deposit of a small percentage (5-10
percent) of the total value of the contracts. "Margin calls,"
i.e. when the trader is asked to provide additional funds
when the margin goes below the "maintenance level," occur
when adverse price movements exist on the market (price
decline for the purchaser and price increase for the seller)
.
Hedging permits a reduction of price risks taken by producers
and firms by shifting part of the risk to speculators.
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5.1.2.2. The Speculator in Futures Markets
Speculators are motivated by profit. They assume
the hedger's risks by taking the opposite side of a contract,
i.e. they agree to either make or take delivery from the
hedger at a later date at a specified price. Speculators do
not take offsetting positions in the cash market. A
speculator profits if he can buy a contract for less than he
sold it for or if he can sell for more than he paid. Trading
by speculators provides market liquidity necessary for the
exchange to function well. Speculators are assumed to be
relatively less risk-averse than hedgers. They play a vital
role in the futures market.
5.2. organization of Coffee Futures Trading
Coffee futures trading is conducted on two
commodity exchanges: the New York Sugar and Coffee Exchange,
and the London Terminal Exchange. The two markets trade
different varieties of coffee and have their own different
contract specifications.
5.2.1. The New York Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE)
The New York Coffee Exchange is the futures market
for Arabica. Trading on the coffee exchange started in 1949
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with the "S" contract, which underwent minor changes to
become the "B" contract in 1956. In 1958, the "M" contract,
based on coffee from Colombia, was born. From 1949 to 1972,
coffee contracts on the New York Coffee Exchange were largely
oriented toward Brazil with Santos coffee (the basic
Brazilian grade) serving as a reference in pricing. Starting
August 24, 1972, the "M" contract was replaced by the "C"
contract. The new contract, still in use, is based on coffee
from Guatemala, Mexico, and El Salvador (i.e., washed Arabica
coffee) with MAMS (Colombian coffees from Manizales, Armenia,
and Medellin) and other Colombian growths deliverable at a
premium. Coffee from eleven 1 additional countries was later
allowed delivery on the "C" contract which still does not
accept Robusta coffee.
A grading system on the exchange differentiates
between discounts for growths below the norm and premium for
growth of better quality, whereas the basis represents the
norm. The differentials are set by the Board of Managers of
the exchange's Coffee Committee based on market conditions
and are reviewed often.
Certification applies to the coffee that is
submitted for delivery on the "C" contract and is based on
the quality of the coffee beans and limited to the number of
imperfections (maximum twenty-three) . Similarly, coffee bean
-'The 11 countries are: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, New
Guinea, Peru, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Burundi,
Ecuador, India, and Rwanda.
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size is subject to regulation and the contract stipulates
that:
1. "50 percent of coffee sampled must screen 15 or larger.
2. No more than 5 percent of coffee sampled may screen below
14."
Another requirement of the contract is that coffee
should be in "sound" condition, i.e. not damaged by improper
storage, shipping, or handling. The standardized contract
size on the New York Exchange for coffee is 37,500 pounds or
250 bags. One bag equals 60 kg (132.28 pounds) of coffee,
delivered ex-warehouse.
Only members of the New York Coffee, Sugar, and
Cocoa Exchange are allowed to do business on the exchange. A
membership is often called a seat on the exchange and non-
members conduct their business through a member who is a
broker. A member may also sell his seat to a non-member
according to certain rules. The CFTC (Commodity Futures
Trading Commission) is the federal agency which has been
regulating the commodity futures industry since 1975. In
1977, the CFTC proposed some regulations related to foreign
traders which would 1. reveal the foreign trader position and
identity; and 2. restrict to a limit foreign access to U.S.
markets
.
The proposition received wide criticism and
opposition by the New York Exchange authorities, who felt the
measures were unfair to foreign traders and could limit their
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future participation in the market. They were, nevertheless,
eventually adopted and
effective in May 1979, foreign brokers were specifically
required to identify and report on individual traders who
held reportable positions through them. .. .Effective in
January 1980, foreign brokers, customers of foreign
brokers, and foreign traders were required to designate
and agent in the U.S. to receive communications from the
CFTC. (Kuhn et al . 1985).
These regulations by the CFTC, except the last one,
have been found, however, by Kuhn et al. not to have affected
the foreign participation in the coffee market that much.
5.2.2. The London Coffee Terminal Market
The Coffee Terminal is a part of the London
Commodity Exchange (LCE) for cocoa, coffee, sugar, and
rubber. It trades only Robusta coffee grown in Africa and
Asia. The standardized contract size is 5 metric tons or
approximately 11,023 pounds delivered on a stored-in-
warehouse basis. The contract also specifies a standard
quality or grade. There are sixteen varieties of Robusta
coffee deliverable at the London Terminal and six grades,
decided by visually classifying and counting defects or
imperfections. The normal Uganda, Ivory Coast (Cote
d'lvoire), Cameroon, and such varieties will pass usually as
grades 1 or 2 . The price is based on grade 1. Samples sent in
for grading must be 3 kg. each representing a specific and
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identifiable lot of five tons. Any suspicion of taint or
unclean smell will warrant rejection as "unsound" coffee.
The Bank of England is the financial regulator of
the London Futures Markets in conjunction with the CTMA
(Coffee Terminal Market Association) for the coffee futures
market. The bank's role is only one of surveillance. Unlike
the New York Exchange, the London Terminal does not have any
written legislation that could prevent any market
flexibility. Also, the London Market has no daily price
fluctuation limit, whereas the New York market imposes a
daily price limit. This latter feature of the London market
seems to be very much favored by some traders, including
Griffins ( Coffee International . 1978) that do not see any
benefit of the price limit procedure.
One innovation of the Coffee Exchanges (London and
New York) is the possibility of dealing in options. An option
confers the right, but not the obligation, to buy or to sell
a futures contract at a specific price on or before a certain
date in the future. On payment of a premium, a client can buy
"call options" (the option to buy) , "put options" (the option
to sell) , and "double options" (the option to buy or sell)
.
The major attraction of options lies in the fact that risk
potential is limited to the extent of the premium. If after
buying a call options for future delivery, the market price
collapses, for example, the option can be negated and all
that would be lost would be the amount of the premium paid.
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In recent years, options have been attracting considerable
interest as shown by the figures; in 1976, 16,000 options
contracts were registered compared to only sixteen options in
1971 on the London Exchange alone.
5.2.3. Limitations of the Coffee Futures Market
Both the New York and the London markets have some
serious limitations in dealing with coffee futures. The New
York futures market serves only as a hedge for washed and a
limited amount of unwashed Arabica coffees but the Brazilian
unwashed Arabica is not tenderable on the New York Exchange
nor on the London Terminal. Also, in New York, Robusta coffee
cannot be delivered on a futures contract. It is tenderable
only on the London market where other coffees are not allowed
delivery. For the coffee futures markets to fulfill their
intended purpose, i.e. reduce price fluctuations and attract
more traders, Zimmerman (1986) proposes to rewrite the
existing coffee contracts for both New York and London and
create a contract against which all coffees can be tendered.
He suggests a same size contract of ten metric tons (medium
between the two present contracts) . That should make real
arbitrage trading possible, argues the author. Other
forthcoming results would also include the "reduction of
squeezes" and a more even distribution of excess supplies
between Europe and the U.S.
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While market participants hope for these changes to
make the coffee futures market a more efficient one, the
present futures market is still better than no futures market
at all so long as it offers coffee producers better ways to
limit risk and ensure more stable export earnings.
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Chapter 6
Optimal Hedging Strategy for a Coffee Producer
Recent literature has emphasized the potential for
primary producers to use the commodity futures markets for
risk management purposes and essentially to protect
themselves from income variability. The first section will
present the background literature dealing with the subject
and in particular the determination of optimal hedging levels
when a producer is faced with uncertainty in prices,
production, and finance. The common assumption made is that
the producer is risk averse.
6.1. Background Studies
McKinnon (1967)
In his article entitled "Futures Markets, Buffer
Stocks, and Income Stability for Primary Producers," McKinnon
took an early look at the potential utilization of futures
markets for income stabilization by primary producers. His
study was one of the first of its kind. Earlier hedging
literature had concentrated rather on decision making of
merchants holding inventories.
In McKinnon' s study, the farmer or primary producer is
assumed to be risk averse and has to deal with output and
price uncertainties. He has to make a trade-off between risk
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and expected output and therefore his objective is to
minimize income variance. The author developed two models to
prove his point.
In the first model, an optimal forward sale is derived
as the only method of hedging available. Under the
assumptions that the producer does not find it feasible to
carry buffer stocks and that there are no hedging costs,
McKinnon's optimal hedge ratio suggested that a farmer faced
with variance in output as well as prices would hedge less
than 100 percent of his expected output and "the greater
output variability is relative to price variability the
smaller will be the optimal forward sale."
McKinnon's second model referred to forward sales
combined with individual buffer stocks over a longer period
of time (two years) . The model revealed that an optimum
combination would minimize the variance of the farmer's
disposable income. The buffer stock in this model took care
of the output fluctuation present in model I
.
The author concluded by restating his first view that
direct spot price manipulation and international commodities
agreements are inefficient ways of stabilizing producer's
income because they are an "unnecessarily costly method of
achieving government policy goals." McKinnon recommends that
"the public authority" get rid of such costly programs and
rather take a long term position on the futures market as the
results of his models suggest.
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Ward and Fletcher (1971)
The authors presented a general theoretical model for
optimal firm decisions in cash and futures markets by
considering both primary producers and marketing agencies.
The model was applied to both short and long hedging and
speculation under income, cost, and risk considerations.
Assuming that the decision maker (a feedlot operator) wished
to maximize expected net income, Ward and Fletcher arrived at
the conclusion that an optimal hedging position in the
futures market given the earliest assumptions may be one of
the following:
1. less than one (less than 100 percent hedge)
2. equal to one (100 percent hedge)
3. greater than one (hedging and speculation), speculation
being "when a firm's futures position exceeds the 100 percent
hedging level or when it does not provide hedging
possibilities in conjunction with the cash market position."
Anne Peck (1975)
In her attempt to derive the optimal hedging level for
an egg producer, Peck used a portfolio-type analysis. She
assumed that production was known; only price was uncertain
and so was expected return. Thus, the author's results
suggest optimal hedge of less than 100 percent of expected
production (75 percent to 95 percent) for the egg producers
for all the different risk parameters: 0° > A > 0.001
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Rolfo (1980)
In the case study of a cocoa producer faced with price
and quantity uncertainty, Rolfo assumed that producers
maximized expected utility of income within a mean-variance
(E-V) framework as well as a Bernouillian utility function.
Rolfo derived the optimal hedge ratio using the forecast
errors on price and quantity obtained from his expectational
values and found a hedging ratio less than one, implying that
a full 100 percent hedge is not recommended for all three
risk averse producers under study (Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, and
Brazil) . However, when the risk parameter is lower than one,
the author recommends a reverse hedging position.
Bond and Thompson (1985)
In their article "Risk Aversion and the Recommended
Hedging Ratio," the authors assumed that an individual wants
to maximize expected profit in the next time period adjusted
to risk where risk is measured by the variance of profit from
their objective function:
-ft- = E(TT) - AvarfTT) A > o
~TT= Profit
Z* = Risk parameter
E = Expectation
Var » Variance
Bond and Thompson derived the optimal hedging ratio that is
dependent on the individual risk parameter:
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1 = tl£2^ii2-^2- + —iLlfc-
V:
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where:
x
= the expected return per unit from holding a long
futures position
P, = the expected return per unit from holding a long cash
position
X;l = level of futures positions
x2 = level of cash positions
r—^
\J 1 = variance of the profit from holding a futures position
(j2 = variance of the profit from holding a cash position
(\12 ~ covariance between the profit from holding a futures
position and the profit from holding a cash position
b = storage cost coefficient
The authors findings show that "whenever transaction costs
associated with storage, financing, or other activities are
nonlinearly related to the level of market participation,
risk will be relevant in the determination of the recommended
hedging ratio." In fact, as risk aversion increases, the
individual hedges more or speculates less, relative to the
cash market.
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Alexander et al. (1986)
The authors presented an empirical analysis of optimal
preharvest decisions in both the cash and futures markets
incorporating price, production, and financial risks. Using a
mean-variance framework on the assumption of a risk averse
producer (corn and soybean producers in Georgia and
Illinois), Alexander et al. reached the conclusion that
A partial hedge is optimal for most situations for risk
averse producers when the amount hedged is variable. With
fixed quantity transactions, speculative and cash
positions, but not hedging, tend to be E-V efficient.
On the other hand, the authors found that the exclusion of
financial costs have limited, if any, effect on the variable
futures positions. They think that is probably the reason why
zero financial costs have been extensively assumed in the
literature.
Miller Stephen (1986)
The author's objective was to test "whether the absence
of basis risk with forward contracting explains apparent
producer preference for forward contracting vis-a-vis direct
hedging as a forward pricing tool." The analysis was done by
following a mean-variance model a la Rolfo with modifications
to "accommodate forward contracting (which is not subject to
basis risk) as an alternative to direct hedging (which is
subject to that risk)." The study was applied to soybean
producers for ten South Carolina counties from 1975 to 1984.
The empirical results indicated that
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the absence of basis risk with forward contracting does
not explain producer preference for forward contracting
over direct hedging as a forward pricing tool. Infinitely
risk averse producers would have incentive to forward
contract or hedge quantities smaller (larger) than their
expected output if yields and harvest time prices are
negatively (positively) correlated.
It can be seen from the past literature dealing with
producer hedging that when the primary producer is faced with
risks, partial hedging may be optimal (i.e. less than 100
percent hedging) . The studies also showed that hedging and
speculation are not two incompatible behaviors. In fact, all
will depend on the association between price and output on
the cash market; a negative price-output correlation will
mean greater hedging incentives for the producer while a
positive correlation may encourage the farmer to combine
hedging and speculation, i.e. hedge more than 100 percent of
his expected output on the futures market.
6.2. Theoretical Framework
Assuming that an important goal of the agricultural
commodity producer is income stabilization, the assumption
that the producer is risk averse becomes an implicit one. The
theoretical foundation of this proposition is that the
producer maximizes expected utility. In the face of risk, the
producer will choose the action which maximizes the expected
value of the utility of the outcome, i.e. his income. The
individual maximizes EU(Y).
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V = risky outcome = income
EU = expected utility
The utility function U(y) for a risk-averse individual is
shown on the figure below:
FIGURE 6.1. THE VALUE OF RISKY OUTCOME
Income Y
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y certainty equivalent income
E(y) = f Yo with probability P
lyj with probability (1-P)
The expected utility is given by:
EU(y) = P [U(y )] + (1-P) [U( Yl )]
A certainty equivalent (CE) is the amount exchanged with
certainty that makes the decision maker indifferent between
this exchange and some particularly risky prospect.
The difference between the expected value of income (i.e. the
mathematical expectation) and the certainty equivalent income
(E(y) - y) is the risk premium i.e. the amount the individual
would pay to avoid a risky situation. For a risk averse
individual, CE < E(Y).
e.g. Assume a person is indifferent to a risky prospect of
P=0.4 of gaining $10,000 and P=0.6 of losing $2,000 and a sure
prospect of gaining $1,560. His certainty equivalent is CE =
$1,560.
If P = 0.5, EU = P [U($10)] + (1-P) [U($1000)].
A special class of utility functions has been found
to be very useful and practical in dealing with the risk-
averse individual and in solving portfolio problems such as
the choice of hedge in a futures market. That special class
is the exponential utility function.
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6.2.1. The Exponential Utility Function
The exponential utility function is described in the
form:
U(y) = l-e'^y
U = Utility
y = Income
e = Exponential
A = constant
This negative exponential utility function has an associated
constant absolute risk aversion coefficient equal to:
-U" = X
U'
where A >0
U 1 = first derivative of U with respect to y
U" = second derivative
One limitation of the exponential utility function
is that the outcomes y are assumed normally distributed and
therefore the absolute risk premium is independent of the
level of wealth. Otherwise the exponential utility function
has several attractive features:
1. It has linear asset demand functions with respect to
wealth
.
2. It allows expected utility to be expressed in terms of the
mean and variance of income alone.
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6.2.2. The Mean-Variance Framework
The mean-variance (E-V) model assumes that attitudes
toward risk are described just in terms of the mean and
variance of income. These characteristics are simple to
estimate and manipulate although they are very restrictive.
From Markowitz (1959) models of portfolio selection, "a
portfolio is E-V efficient if it maximizes expected rate of
return (E) for a given variance (V) and minimizes the
variance for a given expected return."
The E-V Framework assumes four sufficient
conditions:
1. The producer's utility function is quadratic.
2. Net incomes are normally distributed.
3. The producer's choices involve a single random variable.
4. The producer's choices involve a linear combination of the
random variable.
All sufficient conditions have been criticized as
being restrictive but their application remains very
convenient for computational purposes. That is what justifies
the wide use of the E-V model for buffer stock and hedging
problems (Rolfo, Alexander et al., Miller).
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6.3. The Empirical Model
The purpose of this empirical analysis is to derive
the optimal hedging level of a risk-averse coffee producer
facing both guantity and price uncertainties. The data is
applied to Cote d'lvoire which is the third largest coffee
producer with 6 percent of world production and an African
developing country as well. The Ivorian coffee is ordinarily
sold to the world market through a stabilization fund which is
in some respects similar to a marketing board in some other
countries.
In the following, a risk-averse coffee producer
(Cote d'lvoire) maximizes expected utility of income by the
optimal choice of hedging level in the face of price and
production uncertainties within a mean-variance framework. The
producer's objective function is thus:
_TL = EU = E(y) - X Var(y) (1)
A = risk parameter >
Max U(y) = Max Jl = Max E(y) - A Var(y)
under the condition that y is normally distributed:
y/^N[E(y) , Var(y)]
Assume that basis risk exists, i.e. the difference between the
price on the physical market (P) and the futures market (PF)
price at delivery is stochastic. Before the harvest, a future
price (PP) , assumed given and therefore constant, is quoted
that is a predictor of the later realized future price (PF)
.
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If Q is the producer output distribution, his income for
selling on the cash market will be
y = P.Q.
By holding futures contracts n, the producer can
modify his income to be:
R = y + n(PP - PF)
Output and price at harvest can be viewed at planting as
random variables. The futures price at harvest is assumed to
be stochastic at planting.
With hedging, the producer's objective function (1)
becomes
:
jL = eu = E(R) -A Var(R)
Jl = EU = E(y) + n(PP - E(PF) - A [Var(y)
+ n 2Var(PF) - 2nCov(y, PF) ] (2)
Determination of the optimal size of futures contracts, n*
results from maximization of expected utility in equation (2)
with respect to n, the size of the futures contract.
The first order condition^ identifying the optimal
size futures contract, n* is:
an. = o
oSi- = pp - E(PF) - / [2nVar(PF) - 2Cov(y,PF)] =3n
••The second order condition assures a maximum; i.e.
O -TL = - 2 A Var(PF) <
On 2 < A < oO assuming risk aversion
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n* = CoWy. PF) + PP - EfPF) (3)
Var(PF) 2 A Var(PF)
The optimal hedge n* of equation (3) is comprised of hedging
and speculative components.
1. The first term: Covfv. PF) is the hedging component and
Var(PF)
indicates the level of futures holdings which minimizes the
variance of returns. It is the coefficient of PF in a linear
regression where PF is the independent variable and y (i.e.
the producer's nominal revenue generated by selling his
output Q on the cash market) , is the dependent variable.
2. The second term: PP - EfPF) is the speculative component.
2 A Var(PF)
E(PF) is expected price of futures at end of hedge. Var(PF)
is the variance of futures price from a futures market
transaction. The speculative component reflects the effects
of hedging on the level of returns. It is inversely related
to the producer's risk parameter and disappears if the
producer is infinitely risk averse ( A -> CP ) ; or if the
current futures price is an unbiased estimate of the future
price at the time the hedge is lifted., i.e.
PP = E(PF) at delivery, assuming basis = 0.
Following Rolfo's approach and given that the
pattern of coffee production changes with time given the age
of the trees and technological progress, and not taking in
account any basis risk, expectational data rather than
historic data will preferably be used to measure price and
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production uncertainty. Dividing the price by PP (price
forecast) allows for different historical rates of inflation.
Cash price forecast error (ep ) is given by:
ep
= [P - PP]/PP
Futures price forecast error, ef, is given by:
e f = [PF - PP]/PP
Production forecast error, e„, is given by:
eq = [Q - QF]/QF
where QF is forecast production.
Revenue forecast error, e„, from cash marketing is thus:
ey = ep "*" eq + ep* eq
Also: P = PP ( 1 + ep )
PF = PP (1 + e f )
Q = QF (1 + eq )
Optimal hedging level expressed as proportions of forecast
production becomes:
n* = Cov ! (1 + ep ) fl + eq ) ,e £ l
- Eie fJ_
QF Var(e f ) 2^ PP.QF.Var(e f )
(See Appendix E for derivation.)
6.4. Data
The coffee harvest time in Cote d'lvoire is from
November to April. Historical and expectational data used to
derive later the forecast errors are collected for fourteen
seasons, from 1973/74 to 1986/87 under the coffee "C"
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contract on the New York Sugar, Coffee, and Cocoa Exchange.
Two price series were obtained from various issues of The
Wall Street Journal .
(1) The May closing futures prices reported on the last day
of October = futures price predictor (PP) .
(2) The May closing futures prices reported on the first
active trading day of May = futures prices at delivery (PF)
.
May was chosen as futures delivery month because it was the
closest to the Ivorian harvest month (April) for futures to
be delivered on the New York Exchange.
A third price series = the spot May prices on the
cash market were obtained from Gordon and Paton via USDA, for
Robusta coffee, the variety produced by Cote d'lvoire.
Robusta futures prices could not be readily obtained
from the London Coffee Exchange. Therefore, the Arabica
coffee futures prices quoted on the New York Coffee Exchange
and obtained from The Wall Street Journal will be used as a
proxy for the unavailable Robusta futures prices. Thus, it is
to be expected that the futures price (Arabica) and the spot
price (Robusta) not be equal at delivery: this will imply a
positive quality basis, because Arabica is always higher
priced than Robusta, based on coffee quality.
The forecast output (QF) was obtained from the USDA
estimates covering the fourteen seasons (1973-74 to 1986-87)
and approximates very closely the realized output (Q)
published by the ICO.
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6.5. Empirical Results
The variables used in the analysis within the mean-
variance framework are presented in Table 6.1.
Table 6.2 shows the mean values, standard deviation,
and standard errors of mean of the forecast errors used in
the model, along with other statistics. We can note that the
mean of futures forecast error (ef) is positive and
significantly different from zero. The positive mean (e f )
implies that the ratio of optimal hedge (n*/QF) is an
increasing function of the risk parameter in equation (3) .
The mean for forecast errors in cash prices (ep ) and quantity
(e„) are both negative, although close to zero. The variance
of forecast errors for cash prices exceeds that of futures
prices, on the other hand:
Var(ep ) = (0.072) > Var(e f ) = (0.071).
The covariance and correlation matrices among the
forecasting errors are presented in Table 6.3. The
correlation between the forecast error in revenues (ey ) and
the forecast error in the cash market (ep ) is positive (0.80)
and greater than the correlation between forecast error in
revenue and forecast error in production (0.79);
Rey .ep = (0.80) >
Rey .eq
= (0.79)
Similarly Cov(ey .ep ) > Cov(ey .eg)
(0.10) > (0.01)
The covariance between production and price forecast errors
<o« ^oioujc
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TABLE 6.2. SUTOIAKX OF MEAN AND OTHER STATISTICS
OF FORECAST ERRORS VARIABLE USED
ef «fc *y
Mean 0.12349 -0.01008 -0.00731 -0.00098
Standard
Deviation 0.26614 0.26839 0.25990 0.48123
Minimum
Value -0.29608 -0.37620 -0.60000 -0.56886
Maximum
Value 0.67461 0.58921 0.48485 1.35974
STD Error
of Mean 0.07113 0.07173 0.06946 0.12861
Sum 1.72890 -0.14112 -0.10232 -0.01375
Variance 0.07083 0.07203 0.06755 0.23159
Coefficient
of Variation 215.512 2662.624 3556.044 -.9001.077
Root Mean
Square Error 0.32957
9ft
TABLE 6.3. Covariance and Correlation* ffatrices Among Forecast Errors
ef *J
•f .0708313(1.00000)*
.0600163
(0.84022)
.0238638
(0.34500)
.0964475
(0.75305)
.0600163
(0.84022)
.0720325
(1.00000)
.0175891
(0.25216)
0.103859
(0.80412)
.0238638
(0.34500)
.0175891
(0.25216)
.0675469
(1.00000)
.0961006
(0.76836)
.0964475
(0.75305)
0.103859
(0.80412)
.0961006
(0.76836)
0.231587
(1.00000)
*Ccrrelaticn coefficients are in parentheses.
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on the cash market, Cov(ep ,eg) = 0.02, is positive as well as
the correlation coefficient, Re„ = 0.25 implying that the
producer would have incentive to hedge on the market,
quantities greater than expected output (Miller, 1986) .
Risk parameters are arbitrarily chosen within the
range [0, CO ] and optimal hedging levels are reported for
Cote d'lvoire in Table 6.4. for / = 0° ; 1,000; 100; 10; 1;
0.1; 0.01; 0.001. When A = Cfa , the optimal hedging ratio
(n*/QF) is equal to the value of the first term of equation
(3), i.e. the hedge component since the second term, i.e. the
speculative component is zero at that risk level.
For / between 1 and cO , the optimal hedging ratios
are relatively unchanged at 1.36 indicative that the
speculative component is inconsequential for these values of
the risk parameter. However, changes occur for Xi below 1.
For those values of /\ optimal hedging diminishes and becomes
negative for /\ <0.001, i.e. the speculative component
becomes greater than the hedging component and thus, the
producer is net long in the futures market.
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TARTi? 6.4. OPTIMAL HEDGING LEVELS FOR ALTERNATIVE
RISK AVERSION LEVEIS
1974 TO 1987
Risk Parameter Average Optimal Hedge standard Deviation
n*/QF
Cx=> 1.362 0.000
1,000 1.362 0.000
100 1.362 0.000
10 1.361 0.000
1 1.360 0.001
0. 1 1.345 0.006
0. 01 1.192 0.066
0. 001 -0.331 0.657
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
The coffee industry has been a very problematic one
over the years due to the high volatility in prices as well as
in production and consequently producers' income.
The commodity coffee has a very special place in
international trade. It is second only to crude oil as an
earner of foreign exchange for the coffee producing countries.
Coffee is a strategic commodity in commercial relationship
between the third world (producers) and the developed
countries (most consumers)
.
Coffee has long been traded on the futures market
with increasing but still limited participation of the
producers. The reasons for that lack of participation range
from mistrust, strict financial requirements, to ignorance.
Whatever the real cause, producers need to get more acquainted
with futures trading which economic benefits especially the
risk reduction function may be a tool to ensure more stable
revenues
.
This study examines the very dynamic world coffee
market in general and the marketing strategies that have been
used to solve the coffee problem. Use of futures trading as an
additional marketing tool is investigated with respect to
Cote d'lvoire, the third largest (5-6 percent) coffee
producer.
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A mean-variance model associated with varying levels
of the risk aversion parameter and incorporating price as
well as production risk is presented. The model is applied to
coffee data related to Cote d'lvoire in order to determine
optimal hedging levels for that country on the futures
market.
The empirical analysis reveals that a risk averse
producer faced with both price and production uncertainties
would have incentive to hedge quantities bigger than its
expected output if production and cash market prices are
positively correlated. In the case of Cote d'lvoire, optimal
hedging levels greater than unity are encountered.
Cote d'lvoire is a producer that holds a non-
negligible amount of coffee stock from year to year.
Therefore, application of the result found should be feasible
without any greater additional risk. Nevertheless, the study
itself could be extended in many ways by taking into account
financial and exchange rate risks that could restrain a
country from participating to the futures market; also, the
quality basis can be eliminated by using the London Coffee
Exchange Robusta futures prices.
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APPENDIX A. TYPE OF COFFEE PRODUCED BY MEMBERS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COFFEE ORGANIZATION
Exporting member
Angola
Benin
Bolivia
Brazil
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Colombia
Congo
Costa Rica
Cote d'lvoire
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Jamaica
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Mexico
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Uganda
Venezuela
Zaire
Type of coffee
Arabica,
Robusta
Arabica
Arabica
Arabica
Arabica,
Robusta
Arabica
Robusta
Arabica
Robusta
Arabica
Arabica
Arabica
Arabica
Robusta
Robusta
Arabica
Robusta
Arabica
Arabica
Arabica,
Arabica,
Arabica
Arabica
Robusta
Arabica,
Arabica
Arabica
Robusta
Arabica
Arabica
Arabica
Arabica
Arabica
Robusta
Arabica,
Robusta
Robusta
Arabica,
Arabica
Arabica,
Robusta
Robusta
Robusta
Robusta
Robusta
Robusta
Robusta
Robusta
Source: ICO, Statistics on Coffee
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APHNDIX B. MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL OOFFEE ORGANIZATION
Exporting Members f5CO
Angola
Benin*
Bolivia
Brazil
Burundi
Cameroon*
Central African Republic*
Colombia
Congo*
Costa Rica
Cote d'lvoire*
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Eguatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon*
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Jamaica
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar*
Malawi
Mexico
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Sri Lanka
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo*
Trinidad and Tobago
Uganda
Venezuela
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
*OAMCAF members
Source: ICO
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APPENDIX B. Continued
Importing Members (25)
Australia
Austria
Belgium/Luxembourg
Canada
Cyprus
Denmark
Fiji
Finland
France
Germany, Federal Republic of
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States of America
Yugoslavia
European Economic Community
Source : ICO
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APPENDIX C
COFFEE TF.M »1/M
(U.S. DOOMS K> rOUDO)
Price* rising.
/N
Ith Incrtasa withdraw.
3rd Incrtasa ulthdram If IS aarkat
days aftar 4th incrtasa ts «itfi-
dra«n Indicator orlet raaalns «t or
MIm this Itval.
2nd Incraasa withdrawn If 15 mrUt
day* ifttr 3rd Incraasa is «lt»-
dn-n Indicator prlca raaalns at or
bolCM thU ItVtl.
lit Incrtasa withdraw If IS aarkat
days afttr 3rd Incrtasa 1> Kith-
drawn Indicator prlct rtaalns at or
otlow this laval.
1st cut laaasad.
2nd cut i-Qoifd If IS aarkat dar* afttr
lit cut Indicator prlct 1l at or balow
this lovtl.
3rd cut l—IIIJ If » «*« <*** ''ttr
. fc .
2nd cut Indicator or1*t Is »t or balsa
this
laval.
4th cut laoostd If IS atrtat days aftar
3rd cat Indicator prlca Is at or balow
this laval. Emacutlva loard Mats ta
rtvlta aarkat situation and optratlon
of lyttaa af quotas and controls.
(Idpotnt)
» 1.30 a
Quotas suspandad If Indicator prlct
raauilns at or abova 11. SO par pound for
tM consacutlva porlpds of IS aarkat
days unlass tha Uacutlva loard dacldas
othorvlsa.
4th Incrtast tuthorlzad If IS aarkat
days aftar 3rd Incraasa Indicator
prlca Is at or abovt this lovtl.
3rd tncrtasa author Ittd If IS oarfcat
days aftar 2nd Incraasa Indicator prlca
Is at or abovt this laval.
2nd Incrtasa sutftorlltd If IS aarkat
days aftar 1st Incrtasa Indicator
prlct Is at or abova this laval.
1st fncrtsaa authorliad.
lit cut rtatortd If IS days aftar 2nd
cut Is rastortd Indicator prlca is at
or abova this laval.
2nd cut rtstorad If IS days afttr 3rd
cut is rtstorad Indicator prlct Is
at or abovt this Itvtl .
3rd cut rtstorad If IS days aftar
4th cut IS rastorad indicator prlca
i
is at or abova this ltvtl.
4th cut rtstorad.
Source: USDA
V Prices falling
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APPENDIX D.
COMPOSITE INDICATOR PRICES
MONTHLY AVERAGES IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT
APRIL-JUNE 1980 TERMS
1975 TO 1987
(US cents per lb)
Month/year
1975
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1976
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1977
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Monthly averages
U.N. index of
unit value of exports
(April-June 1980-100)
Curpent
terms 1/
TTT (2)
Constant
April -June 1980
terms 2/
(3)
97.86
65 55.08 84.74
65 52.94 81.45
65 49.85 76.69
65 48.33 74.35
65 49.19 75.68
65 52.64 80.98
62 62.18f 100.29
62 80.27 129.47
62 78.49 126.60
61 76.73 125.79
61 74.47 122.08
61 78.64 128.92
65 135.19 207.98
63 85.99 136.49
63 90.94 144.35
63 90.98 144.41
63 115.14 182.76
63 128.55 204.05
63 139.82 221.94
64 131.79 205.92
64 143.00 223.44
64 148.22 231.59
66 162.62 246.39
66 179.63 272.17
66 205.54 311.42
1° 229.21 327.44
67 217.61 324.79
67 245.93 367.06
67 305.13 455.42
69 314.96 456.46
69 277.41 402.04
69 243.06 352.26
71 209.00 294.37
71 201.36 283.61
71 195.78 275.75
73 172.48 236.27
73 182.13 249.49
73 185.70 254.38
f: Frost in Brazil
d: Drought in Brazil
1/ Prices in current terms refer to the average of Other Milds and
™ Robustas up to September 1976, Composite Indicator Price 1976
up to September 1981 and Composite Indicator Price 1979 thereafter
2/ Prices in constant terms refer to prices in current terms deflated
_
by the U.N. index of unit values of exports of manufactured goods
from developed market economies (Base: April-June 1980 100)
Source: ICO: Coffee Statistics
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(Cont'd 1)
Month/year
COMPOSITE INDICATOR PRICES
MONTHLY AVERAGES IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT
APRIL-JUNE 1980 TERMS
1975 TO 1987
(US cents per lb)
Monthly averages
U.N. index of
uni c value of exports Current
(April-June 1980-100) terms V
(1) (2)
80 155. 15f
76 191.65
76 186.08
lb 166.37
78 161.69
78 152.86
78 159.82
82 130.17
82 133. 34f
82 151.12
85 151.89
85 145.21
85 131.58
91 169. 50f
88 130.93
88 127.76
88 132.76
88 140.22
88 148.74
88 190. 99f
93 199.78
9 3 189.70
93 198.36
95 196.97
95 192.19
95 185.63
101 150.67
98 165.62
98 163.42
98 177.14
100 171.86
100 182.30
100 175.22
104 151.81
104 134.02
104 125.42
101 125.79
102 115.61
102 119.87
Constant
April-June 1980
terms 2/
(3)
1978
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1979
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1980
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
193.94
252.17
244.84
218.91
207.29
195.97
204.90
158.74
162.61
184.29
178.69
170.84
154.80
186.26
148.78
145.18
150.86
159.34
169.02
217.03
214.82
203.98
213.29
207.34
202.31
195.40
149.18
169.00
166.76
180.76
171.86
182.30
175.22
145.97
128.87
120.60
123.32
113.34
117.52
f: Frost in Brazil
d: Drought in Brazil
1/ Prices in current terms refer to the average of Other MLlds and
Robustas up to September 1976, Composite Indicator Price 1976
up to September 1981 and Composite Indicator Price 1979 thereafter
2/ Prices in constant terms refer to prices in current terms deflated
by the U.N. index of unit values of exports of manufactured goods
from developed market economies (Base: April-June 1980 100)
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(Cont'd 2) COMPOSITE INDICATOR PRICES
MONTHLY AVERAGES IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT
APRIL-JUNE 1980 TERMS
1975 TO 1987
(US cents per lb)
U^1. index of
Monthly averages
Constant
unit VItlue of exports Current April-June 1980
Month/year (April-•June 1980-100) terms V terms 2/
(1) (2) (3)
1981 21 115. 42f 121.49
January 9 Q 124.93 126.19
February 99 120.18 121.39
March 99 119.93 121.14
April
May
June
95 120.57 126.92
95 117.15 123.32
95 98.59 103.78
July
August
93 104. 13f 111.97
93 107.24 115.31
September 93 107.45 115.54
October 97 117.67 121.31
November 97 124.60 128.45
December 97 122.64 126.43
1982 23 125.00
134.41
January 95 124.43 130.98
February 95 134.30 141.37
March 95 129.01 135.80
April 94 124.01 131.93
May
June
94 120.56 128.26
94 121.14 128.87
July
August
September
October
92 115.92 126.00
92
92
117.45
122.78
127.66
133.46
89 128.84 144.76
November 89 130.17 146.26
December 39 131.33 147.56
1983 89 127.98 143.80
January 92 127.24 138.30
February 92 124.35 135.16
March 92 123.14 133.85
April
May
June
90 123.00 136.67
90 125.82 139.80
90 123.80 137.56
July
August
September
38 124.20 141.14
88 124.93 141.97
88 127.11 144.44
October S8 135.52 154.00
November 38 136.95 155.63
December 88 139.72 158.77
f: Frost in Brazil
d: Drought in Brazil
1/ Prices in current terms refer to the average of Other Milds and
Robustas up to September 1976, Composite Indicator Price 1976
up to September 1981 and Composite Indicator Price 1979 thereafter
Prices in constant terras refer to prices in current terms deflated
by the U.N. index of unit values of exports of manufactured goods
from developed market economies (Base: April-June 1980 100)
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(Cont'd 3)
Month/year
COMPOSITE INDICATOR PRICES
MONTHLY AVERACES IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT
APRIL-JUNE 1980 TERMS
1975 TO 1987
(US cencs per lb)
Monthly averages
O.N. index of Constant
unit value of exports Current April-June I960
(April-June 1980=100) terms 1/ terns 2/
(1) (2) C3)
1984
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1985
January-
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
19B6
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
88
S3
83
80
89
89
84
84
S4
84
s:
82
32
85
85
85
3?
89
89
94
9-
94
105 e
100
100
100
103
103
103
108
108
103
108e
108e
108e
141.19
138.32
141.11
143.18
143.89
148.36
145.43
141.01
143.13
141.85
135.99
138.14
133.89
133. iO d
135.46
133.30
132.26
132.02
131.87
131.04
120.68
119.96
118. 78d
125.93
140.91
174.84
170.93
204.02
195.11
204.23
191.73
176.92
151.14
149.12
154.38
181.45
163.21
149.42
130.41
157. 18
160. 35
162. 70
161. 67
16=. 70
163. 40
167 87
170, 39
163. 87
161. 89
164, 45
159..39
152. 99
165 .20
162 .56
161 .29
155 .22
155 .14
154 .16
135 .60
13- .79
133 .46
133 .97
149 .90
186 .CD
162 .79
204 .02
195 .11
204 .23
186 .15
171 .77
146 .74
133 .07
142 .94
163 .0!
151 .12
13S .35
120 .75
1987
January (1-26) 118.30
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APPENDIX E. DERIVATION OF THE OPTIMAL HEDGE n*
USING EXPECTED ERRORS FORECASTS
R = P.Q + n[PP - PF];
3\-= E(R) - Avar(R)
Var(R) = Var(P.Q) + n2 Var(PF) - 2nCov(P.Q, PF)
if P = PP(1 +ep)
Q = QF(1 +eq)
PF = PP(1 + ef )
Thus E(R) = E[PP(1 + ep).QF(l + eq
}
] + n[PP-E(PP(l + ef ) )
]
Var(y) = Var[PP(l + ep) .QF(1 + %j ] + n2Var(PP(l + ef ) ) ] -
2nCov[PP(l + ep).QF(l + QjKPPU + ef ) ]
.
If Si = E(R) - / Var(R)
C)JL = PP - E[PP(1 + ef)] _^ [2nVar[PP(l + ef ) +
"d n
2Cov[PP(l + ep).QF(l + eg),PP(l + ef ) ] =0
2AnVar[PP(l + ef ) ] = PP - E[PP(1 + ef ) J + 2/cov[ ].
PPa + ef)l + PP-ErPPfl + e£ )l
2/ Var[PP(l + ef)] 2/ Var[PP(l + ef )
;
given:
Var[PP(l + ef ) ] = Var(PP + ef .PP) = PP
2 Var(ef)
E[PP(1 + ef)] = E(PP) + PP.E(ef) = PP + PP.E(ef )
n* = CovfPPfl ± enl.OFfl ± &-,) ,PPfl ± ef)l + PP - \PP + PP.E(efl]
PP^ Var(efy 2 y| .PP^.Varfef)
n* = Covr fl + eo) .OFfl + e^) ,ef l - MSfL
Var(ef ) 2 X PP.Var(ef )
Dividing n* by QF gives us:
B* = Cov m + epUl + eg).ef l - Eiefl
QF Var(ef) 2 ^ QF.PP.Var(ef )
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ABSTRACT
Cote d'lvoire is typical of most coffee producing
countries in that it is a less developed country and
economically depends very much on coffee exports.
A review of the particular charasteristics of the
world coffee economy in general (volatility in prices and
quantities, low demand, price and income elasticities) , and
an overview of the Ivorian coffee marketing in particular,
are completed. Emphasis is placed on the problems of the
coffee industry that impact income variability in producing
countries. Efforts to control income variability through
jointly determined marketing quotas and controls are
reviewed.
This study also attempts to determine the optimal
hedging level for Cote d'lvoire on the futures market as an
additional marketing strategy to insure more stable revenues
from coffee exports. A Mean-Variance model is used which
incorporates price and production risks for that purpose.
The results indicate that a risk averse producer
country would hedge more than 100 percent of its production
if cash prices and quantity are positively correlated as is
the case with Cote d'lvoire.
